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Title: 	 Bonneville Power Administration and the Creation of the Pacific Intertie, 
1958 -1964 
Construction of the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie (also known 
as the Pacific Intertie) began in 1964, following the culmination of a series of 
interrelated negotiations which included: 1) the planning for the construction and 
operation of the Pacific Intertie; 2) the passage of federal legislation that put limits on 
the export of electricity from the regions where it was generated; and 3) the full 
ratification of the Columbia River Treaty between the United States and Canada. 
By 1970, with construction complete, the Pacific Intertie allowed for the movement of 
more than 4,000,000 kilowatts ofpower among the electrical systems of British 
Columbia and eleven Western states, including 243 rural electrical cooperatives, 
municipal systems, and other public agencies. It had essentially become the backbone 
of the largest electrical grid in the Western world. In addition to widening the 
marketing area available to power producers throughout the grid, the Pacific Intertie 
also integrated the operations of the nation's largest hydropower system (Bonneville 
Power Administration), the largest privately owned electrical system (Pacific Gas & 
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Electric), and the largest municipal power system (L.A. Department of Water and 
Power) in the country. 
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Preface 
This thesis began as a historical study of the John Day Dam on the Columbia 
River. In the process of exploring the role that dam has play~d in the electrical grid 
operated by the Bonneville Power Administration (BP A), it became apparent to me 
that a much more important and interesting history was in need of being written­
namely the creation of the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie system 
(hereafter referred to as the Pacific Intertie). 1 The construction of the Pacific Intertie 
in the 1960s represents a milestone in American history in regards to the long distance 
transmission ofhigh voltage electrical currents. Never before had the country's public 
and" private interests converged to integrate so many sub-regional electrical systems 
into such a large electrical grid. F or this reason alone, it deserves more attenti.on by 
scholars. Still, while the technological achievements related to the construction and 
operation of the Pacific Intertie are important, I argue that they are less important than 
a related series of negotiations that took place between the United States and Canada 
and between the BP A and a range ofpublic and private power interests at local, state, 
regional, federal, and intemationallevels. 
While exploring the history of the Pacific Intertie, it also became apparent to 
me that I was researching the origins of the American West's electrical grid. By the 
mid-twentieth century there was already a high level of electrical interconnection 
linking together various sub-grids across the West (and for that matter, throughout the 
entire continent); however, none of the connections between local distribution systems 
1 High voltage electrical power lines are typically referred to as "interties" within the electrical industry. 
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throughout the region were engineered to carry excessively large e1ectricalloads of 
500 kilovolts (kv) or more. The construction of the Pacific Intertie during the 1960s 
was unique because of its geographical reach, its ability to transport vast amounts of 
energy, and the way in which power managers used it to take advantage of diversities 
within the territories it spanned. 
Rather than discussing the intellectual origins of the American West's 
electrical grid, its steady development through second half of the twentieth century, or 
a detailed analysis of its operations, this historical study attempts to explain how the 
backbone of the Western grid grew from the successful outcomes of thr~e intersecting 
arenas of negotiation, negotiations that through the early to mid-l 960s became 
increasingly intertwined and ultimately interdependent. These three spheres of 
negotiation included: 1) the planning for the construction and operation of the Pacific 
Intertie; 2) the passage of federal legislation that put limits on the export of electricity 
from the regions where it was generated; and 3) the full ratification of the Columbia 
River Treaty between the United States and Canada. 
The successful culmination of these negotiations in 1964 allowed for the 
creation of an electrical grid that by 1970 included Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and 
California, along with parts ofBritish Columbia, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and 
Arizona. As the century wore on, the grid expanded into Alberta, moved further 
toward the Rockies, and even stretched across the nation's southern border into 
Mexico. 
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The wide-ranging geography of this electrical grid created opportunities to 
maximize the efficiency of electrical operations, largely by taking advantage of 
diversities within the system. For example, thermal plants throughout .the Southwest, 
which operate best if allowed to run non-stop at a consistent level of output, have 
largely been spared the necessity of ramping up production during predictable daily 
peaks in power usage. Following the creation ofthe Pacific Intertie system, the grid's 
hydropower plants in the Northwest have been able to supply much of the energy 
needed across the grid by producing a surge ofpower each day during breakfast and 
dinner times. At night, as the reservoirs recharge and the thermal plants produce more 
power than local markets can absorb, much of the excess power is sent northward, 
completing a reciprocal exchange ofpower that has been going on now for decades. 
The expanse of the West's new electrical grid also allowed for seasonal 
exchanges ofpower between the Northwest and Southwest. Hot, dry summers in the 
Southwest created conditions for annual peaks in electrica1loads to supply power for 
irrigation pumps and air conditioners. The Northwest, with i.ts rivers swollen with 
snowmelt during its comparatively mild summers, exported surplus power south to 
meet the Southwest's needs. Conversely, demand for space heating during the cold 
winters in the Northwest created annual peaks in electrical loads at the same time 
when water levels were at their annual lows. At such times, the Southwest, with its 
mild winters, would send power north. 
Power planners had understood the potential opportunities this kind of 
symbiotic relationship offered the Pacific Coast states since at least the mid-1930s, 
Vlll 
when the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission first officially 
suggested the construction of an Intertie connecting the grids of the Pacific Northwest 
and California.2 Still, while various proposals began circulating through the halls of 
Congress as early as 1948, it took another decade until the project would begin gaining. 
traction on Capital Hill.3 It was not unti11958 that the BPA, whose budget had 
recently been pushed into the red from the combination of a doWnturn in the region'S 
aluminum industry and reduced residential· demand (stemming from a mild winter), 
began planning for the creation of a rehitively short intertie to market excess power 
from their grid across the California state line to the Pacific Gas & Electric Company. 
It is here, in 1958, that the following narrative begins. 
A note on sources 
It is important to point out that the following history is, to a large degree, a 
work in progress. The primary source material on the topic is mountainous and spread 
across a geography that reaches from Portland to Washington D.C. and from British 
Columbia to Arizona. The following history has been crafted largely from source 
material found in the Library of the BPA (Portland) and the National Archives (Pacific 
2 Bonneville Power Administration, Pacific Intertie (Portland, Oreg.: Bonneville Power Administration, 
ca. 1984). An earlier can for the construction of a connecting line between British Columbia and 
Southern California was made by Carl Edward Magnusson, director of the Engineering Station at the 
University of Washington in 1919. Magnusson's suggestion for a line appeared to be related to 
efficiencies related more to the public ownership of such a line, rather than to the efficiencies stemming 
from production and consumption diversities across the region's systems. See Gus Norwood, Columbia 
River Power for the People: A History ofPolicies ofthe Bonneville Power Administration (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981),52. 
3 Norwood, Power for the People, 237. 
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Alaska Region, Seattle). Repeated visits to both locations have led to new findings, 
and in the case of the BP A, where the staff have recently begun systematically 
cataloging their own library, there is much more intertie-related material that I'm sure 
wi~l eventually become accessible. 
As I was doing research in Seattle, there were several holdings in the National 
Archives that had been documented as being "recalled to the BP A" and "subsequently 
lost."4 These materials were related specifically to the Pacific Intertie and the 
Columbia River Treaty. An investigation by the archivists at the National Archives 
. 

turned up nothing in their own records center (thinking perhaps they had been re­
accessioned at a later date and stored somewhere else), and there was nothing at the 
BPA to indicate the location of the lost files. However, on a later visit to the BPA 
Library, I did find one of the "lost" sources, the minutes from the BP A 
Administrator's meetings during Charles Luce' s tenure, while randomly perusing the 
shelf space around something else I was retrieving. It was uncatalogued. I suspect 
that there may be other "lost" sources uncatalogued on their shelves as well. 
Fortunately, many of Bemard Goldhammer's (BPA Power Manager) files were 
not pulled from the National Archive's holdings, for it was within his voluminous files 
that I found much of the substantive correspondence between the BP A and its various 
government, private sector, and public utility contacts related to the planning and 
4 The records "retrieved from FRC [Federal Records Center] and then lost at BPA Headquarters" were 
removed in 1972, 1981, 1991, and 1992. These records include, but are likely not limited to: RG 305, 
Accession # 305-77-0014 (150093-02), Power Resources Project Files, 1943 - 65 (Power Study Data); 
RG 305, Accession # 305-75-AI121 (10305-06), Program Subject Files,. 1955 1971 (Columbia River 
Treaty Files); RG 305, Accession # 305-81-0033 (947705), Minutes of Administrator's StaffMeetings 
(1960 1965); and RG 305, Accession # 305-73A0069 (47985-86), Project Subject Files, 1959 - 67 
(Canadian Storage, 1959 65; Interconnections & Interties, 1960 67). 
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construction of the Pacific Intertie and the passage of the regional preference 
legislation. Another set of files kept by a BP A employee, Henderson M. McIntyre 
(Chief, Branch of Power Resources), contained an important cache of correspondence 
generated from the BP A's efforts related to Columbia River Treaty that were 
particularly focused on negotiations over the fate of Canada's downstream benefits 
stemming from the treaty. Together, these manuscript collections account for the 
largest bulk of material-approximately 1,500 pages-from which much of the 
following narrative has been created. 
Following the advice ofmy advisor, other mentors, and peers-whose mantra 
during the past two years has been to "just finish it," I am writing this narrative with 
the knowledge that further research will no doubt fine-tune several points raised in this 
master's thesis. An exploration of the City of Los Angeles Water and Power 
Department's records, for example, will no doubt help shed further light on the 
motives and strategies of these important participants in Pacific Intertie's creation. 
Still, I'm confident that my BPA-centric historical analysis will help forward 
scholarship on this important topic by providing a sound foundation that other scholars 
build upon. Furthermore, because the BP A was the most active and central 
organization involved in the negotiations surrounding the Pacific Intertie, I am 
confident that a historical analysis stemming largely from their correspondence files 
will not to be too far off the mark, even if it is ultimately incomplete. 
As of this writing there is a surprising dearth of secondary literature on the 
historical formation of the United State's electrical transmission infrastructure. For 
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the American West, what little exists is focused primarily on an earlier era of 
development covering the period from the end of the nineteenth century up to World 
War II. Most notable in this regard is Jay Brigham's Empowering the West: Electrical 
Politics Before FDR (1998) and James C. Williams' Energy and the Making of 
Modern California (1997). WhlleBrigham's work is primarily focused on the battles 
between public and private power interests, his case studies on Seattle and Los 
Angeles are helpful for those interested in building a foundation of knowledge on the 
region'S energy history. Likewise, Williams' study of the development ofCalifornia's 
energy systems stands out for the breadth of information offered to his readers on the 
topic. While Bringham does not extend the timeframe for his analysis beyond the 
Great Depression, Williams does. Unfortunately-at least for my purposes­
Williams's focus on the post-war period is primarily on California's history and 
geography of power production (and to a lesser extent on power consumption). Once 
his analysis moves beyond the pUblic-private power struggles of the 1920s and 1930s 
and the resulting status ofCalifornia's sub-regional power grids, he says nothing more 
on the evolution of the state's electrical transmission systems. Neither the Pacific 
Intertie nor the Bonneville Power Administration, let alone the Columbia River 
system, are mentioned at all.5 
With a couple important exceptions, the majority ofrelated work carried out by 
historically oriented scholars of the American West tends to focus on the development 
of water resources. However, these studies routinely avoid any detailed discussion 
5 Jay L. Bringham, Empowering the West: Ele~trical Politics Before FDR (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1998); James C. Wit] i.ams, Energy and the Making ofModern California, (Akron, Dh.: 
University of Akron Press, 1997). . 
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about the relationships between the West's water projects and the electrical grids in 
which they are located. These analyses offer much insight into how the West's rivers 
have been reshaped to serve the needs of an immigrant society hungry for power of all 
kinds (cultural, economical, political, and electrical), and they are especially helpful in 
understanding the many conflicts surrounding water development projects. Most 
notable in this regard are Norris Hundley, Jr.'s The Great Thirst: Californians and 
Water: A History (2001); Donald Worster's Rivers ofEmpire: Water, Aridity, and the 
Growth ofthe American West (1985); Donald Pisani's Water and American 
Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 1902­
1935 (2002); and Mark Reisner's Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its 
Disappearing Water (1986).6 
Similarly, Samuel Hays' Conservation and the Gospel ofEfficiency: The 
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890 1920 (1959), Richard Lowitt's The New 
Deal and the West (1984), and Gerald Nash's The Federal Landscape: An Economic 
History ofthe Twentieth Century West (1999) provided guidance for gaining a more 
nuanced understanding of the federal government's role in developing much of the 
American West's electrical infrastructure.7 Still, while these works were helpful in 
6 Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst: Californians and Water: A History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001); Donald Worster, Rivers ofEmpire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth ofthe 
American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Donald Pisani, Water and American 
Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West, 1902 1935 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002); and Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its 
Disappearing Water, (New York: Penguin Books, 1986). 
7 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel ofEfficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1880 -1920 (pittsburgh, Penn.: University ofPittsburgh Press, 1999, originally published 
by Harvard University Press, 1959); Richard Lowitt, The New Deal and the West (Norman: University 
of Qklahoma Press, 1984); and Gerald Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History ofthe 
Twentieth Century West (Tucson: University ofArizona Press, 1999). 
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my efforts to contextualize the histories surrounding the Pacific Intertie, none of 
these authors addressed its existence directly. 
Other works are more specifically focused on the Columbia River Basin and 
provide important context to the development of the region's hydropower system and 
related conflicts. These include: William L. Lang and Robert Carriker's Great River 
·ofthe West: Essays on the Columbia River (1999), William Dietrich's Northwest 
Passage: The Great Columbia River (1995), Richard White's The Organic Machine: 
The Remaking ofthe Columbia River (1995), Daniel Ogden, Jr.'s "The Development 
ofFederal Power in the Pacific Northwest" (1949), Charles McKinley's Uncle Sam in 
the Pacific Northwest: Federal Management ofNatural Resources in the Pacific 
Northwest (1952), Franklyn D. Mahar's "The Politics ofPower: The Oregon Test for 
Partnership" (1974), Philip J. Funigiello's "The Bonneville Power Administration and 
the New Deal" (1973), William F. Willingham's Army Engineers and the 
Development ofOregon: A History ofthe Portland District u.s. Army Corps of 
Engineers (1983), Phyllis Komer~k De Kuna's Public versus Private Power During 
the Truman Administration (1977), Keith Petersen and Mary Reed's Controversy, 
Conflict and Compromise: A History ofthe Lower Snake Development (1994), Karl 
Boyd Brooks' Public Power, Private Dams: The Hells Canyon High Dam 
Controversy (2006), Kai N. Lee and Donna Lee Klemka's Electric Power and the 
Future ofthe Pacific Northwest (1980), Jeff Hammarlund's "Oregon's Role as an 
Energy Innovator: A Historical Perspective" (2002), Cain Allen's '''They Called It 
Progress': Indians, Salmon, and the Industrialization of the Columbia River" (2000), 
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and the National Research Council's Managing the Columbia River: Instream 
Flows, Water Withdrawals, and Salmon Survival (2004).8 
For a background on the Columbia River Treaty itself, the most informative 
works include Neil Swanson's Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background 
to an Historic Treaty (1979), John V. Krutilla's The Columbia River Treaty: The 
Economics ofan International River Basin Development (1967), James F. Hanks' 
"The Columbia River Treaty: A Case Study of International River Basin Development 
with Emphasis on Power Production" (1970), John Murray McMenemy's "The 
Columbia River Treaty, 1961 - 1964: A Study of Opposition and Representation in 
the Canadian Political System" (1969), and a richly informative chapter in John 
Elliot's The Sociology ofNatural Resources (1981). While much of the analysis of the 
treaty tends to focus on which country got the better deal, these works helped 
8 William L. Lang and Robert C. Carriker, eds., Great River ofthe West: Essays on the Columbia River 
(Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1999); William Dietrich, Northwest Passage: The Great 
Columbia River (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1995); Richard White, The Organic 
Machine: The Remaking ofthe Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Daniel Ogden, "The 
Development ofFederal Power Policy in the Pacific Northwest" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1949); Charles McKinley, Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest: Federal Management of 
Natural Resources in the Columbia River Valley (Berkeley, University ofCali fomi a Press, 1952); 
Franklyn D. Mahar, "The Politics of Power: The OregonTest for Partnership," Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 65: 1 (1974),29 - 37; Philip 1. Funigiello, "The Bonneville Power Administration and the 
New Deal," Prologue 5:2 (1973): 89 - 97; William F. Willingham, Army Engineers and the 
Development ofOregon: A History ofthe Portland District U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983); Phyllis Komarek De Luna, Public Versus Private Power 
During the Truman Administration: A Study ofFair Deal Liberalism (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 1977); Keith C. Petersen and Mary E. Reed, Controversy, Conflict and Compromise: A 
History ofthe Lower Snake Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994); Karl 
Boyd Brooks, Public Power, Private Dams: The Hells Canyon High Dam Controversy (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2006); Kai N. Lee and Donna Lee Klemka, Electric Power and the 
Future ofthe Pacific Northwest (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1980); Jeff Hammarlund, 
"Oregon's Role as an Energy Innovator: A Historical Perspective," Oregon's Future 3: 1 (2002), 10­
16; Cain Allen, '''They Called It Progress': Indians, Salmon, and the Industrialization of the Columbia 
River" (master's thesis, Portland State University, 2000); and National Research Council, Managing the 
Columbia River: Instream Flows, Water Withdrawals, and Salmon Survival (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2004). 
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contextualize the history of the treaty and confirmed information gleaned from the 
BPA's records at the National Archives.9 
Most helpful in getting a better understanding of Pacific Intertie and the 
historical development of the West's electrical transmission infrastructure were 
Michael Blumm's essay, "The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage," in Northwest 
Lands, Northwest Peoples: Readings in Environmental History (1999), and Gus 
Norwood's Columbia River Power for the People: A History ofPolicies ofthe 
Bonneville Power Administration (1981), Gene Tollefson's BPA and the Struggle/or 
Power at Cost (1987), and Vera Springer's Power and the Pacific Northwest (1976), 
all contracted by the BPA; and Douglas Norwood's "Administrative Challenge and 
Response: The Role of the Bonneville Power Administration in the West Coast 
Intertie Decision" (1966). 10 
Blumm's work, while necessarily topical, provides a basic understanding of 
the formation of the Northwest's regional electrical grid, essentially built up from an 
original triangular foundation joining together Grand Coulee Dam, Bonneville Dam 
9 Neil Swanson, Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background to an Historic Treaty 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979); John V. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: The 
Economics ofan International River Basin Development (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 
1967); James F. Hanks, "The Columbia River Treaty: A Case Study of Intemational River Basin 
Development with Emphasis on Power Production" (master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1970); John 
Murray McMenemy, "The Columbia River Treaty, 1961 -1964: A Study ofOpposition and 
Representation in the Canadian Political System" (master's thesis, University of Toronto,1969); and 
John Elliot, The Sociology ofNatural Resources (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1981). 
10 Michael C. Blumm, "The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage," in Northwest Lands, Northwest 
Peoples: Readings in Environmental History, eds. Dale D. Goble and Paul W. Hirt (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1999) 229 - 263; Norwood, Power for the People; Gene Tollefson, BPA and the 
Struggle for Power at Cost (Portland, Ore.: Bonneville Power Administration, 1987); Vera Springer, 
Power and the Pacific Northwest: A History ofthe Bonneville Power Administration (Portland, Ore.: 
Bonneville Power Administration, 1976); and Douglas Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and 
Response: The Role of the Bonneville Power Administration in the West Coast Intertie Decision" 
(bachelor of arts thesis, Reed College, 1966). 
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(and Portland), and the Seattletracoma area. Blumm also makes a connection 
between the brokering of the Columbia River Treaty and the subsequent marketing of 
power southward into California. Additionally, he highlights the importance of the 
Northwest's hydropower plants in supplying peak power demands across the electrical 
grid. 11 
Gus Norwood's Power for the People, Tollefson's BPA and the Struggle for 
Power at Cost, and Springer's Power and the Pacific Northwest together provide an 
indispensable resource for understanding the history of the BP A. They are simply the 
best (and only) reference materials on the agency's history in print. They provided me 
with background information on BP A's policies and an overview of the efforts to 
create the Northwest's transmission grid, including the BPA's efforts to connect that 
grid to California's burgeoning electrical markets. 
The most informative secondary source for this study has naturally been 
Douglas Norwood's "Administrative Challenge and Response." I first reviewed this 
thesis while doing research on the John Day Dam, and I was struck by the speed at 
which his analysis of the Intertie decision appeared, just two years after its approval by 
Congress in 1964. I was immediately curious how accessible the BP A records had 
been to an undergraduate so soon after such contested negotiations had come to a 
close-and before the Pacific Intertie's construction had even been completed. I could 
not help but wonder: Was this thesis a reliable source? 
The answer, as it turns out, is yes; furthermore, his findings-at least in 
regards to the negotiations surrounding the Pacific Intertie-parallel my own. The 
11 Blumm, "The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage," 269 ~ 275. 
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biggest difference is that he relied extensively upon unrecorded interviews with 
the BPA's staff. This thesis, in comparison, relies heavily upon publicly accessible 
records kept by some of the same staff he interviewed. Another difference between 
our studies is that Norwood's primary focus is the administrative decision-making 
process that guided negotiations. This thesis, instead, focuses on the discovery and 
synthesis of primary source materials in the construction of a historical narrative on 
the creation of the Pacific Intertie. 
Another difference between Norwood's work and my own is that he relied 
heavily on transcripts from Congressional hearings regarding the Pacific Intertie' s 
authorization and its subsequent appropriations. After comparing his use and 
interpretation of the hearings with the archived correspondence between the 
Department of Interior, Bonneville Power Administration, Congressional committee 
members, and others involved, which often included excerpts from the hearings 
themselves, I. found his interpretations to be both reliable and insightful. 
--
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CHAPTER 1: BP A Surplus Power and the California Market 
During the mid-twentieth century, Americans engineered the Columbia River 
system in an extensive effort to maximize the benefits it could provide to the Pacific 
Northwest. The remade river was designed to irrigate farms, increase trade, control 
floods, provide recreation, and-most importantly-to produce electricity. The 
single-most transformative change in the history of the Columbia Basin involved the 
proliferation ofmassive darns built by the u.s. Army Corps ofEngineers, the U.S. 
Bureau ofRec1arnation, and various public and private utilities. Collectively, these 
darns turned the regions' rivers-or at least large stretches of them-into slow-moving 
lakes. On the Columbia, efforts by the Army Corps to implement their Main Control 
Plan worked to reduce the spring and summer freshet of snowmelt so that the 
seasonally abundant water could be put to the above-mentioned "beneficial" uses year­
round. 
As each federal dam was authorized by Congress, it was understood that they 
would be self-liquidating, meaning that they would pay for themselves through the 
production and sale of the electricity that they generated. This payment strategy 
became institutionalized when Congress passed the Bonneville Power Act in 1937, 
creating the self-funded Bonneville Power Administration and charging it with the 
responsibility ofmarketing, transmitting, and selling electricity generated from the 
region's federal power-producers. 
2 
With the completion of each successive dam on the river, Bonneville's debt 
grew larger, but so too did its customer base. Beginning in the 1940s, as part of the 
war effort, Bonneville's repayments to the federal treasury were also given a boost by 
the attraction of energy-intensive aluminum production plants to their electrical 
territory. The aluminum plants purchased large volumes of "frrm" power from the 
BP A, and after 1948, also began purchasing sizable blocks of interruptible 
"secondary" power as well. 12 Electricity sold from within the predictable volume of 
power able to be generated during the lowest water levels on record is considered 
"firm." Any power produced during periods of higher water flow is classified as 
"secondary" power (often also referred to as "surplus" power) and is less expensive 
because its availability can be withdrawn ifwater levels drop. By contracting for large 
volumes ofboth firm and secondary power, the Northwest's aluminum industry 
proved to be a dependable source of revenue for the BP A from the 1940s into the 
1950s. 
By the mid-1950s, following the authorization and appropriation of funds for 
additional dams by Congress, the BPA's debt threatened to outpace its available 
market. In 1958, spurred by a mild winter (which reduced heating demands) and an 
economic recession that hit the region'S aluminum industry particularly hard, the BPA 
began to post annual deficits. For the BPA, this was especially frustrating, because 
roughly $20 to $30 million worth of water was "wasted" that year simply because they 
did not have any customers for the power it would have generated had it passed 
12 Norwood, Power for the People, 136. 
3 
through some turbines on the way to the ocean.13 This "surplus" power needed 
buyers for Bonneville to get back in the black. Unfortunately for Bonneville, because 
the availability of surplus power is highly unpredictable, finding buyers proved to be a 
difficult proposition. 14 
In 1958, under the leadership ofAdministrator William Pearl, the BP A started 
negotiating a contract with California-based Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) to buy at 
least $2,000,000 worth of the BPA's surplus power. To get the electricity, PG&E 
planned to build an 80-mile, 230-kv intertie from its Pit River plant in northern 
California to connect with a 230-kv line owned by the California-Oregon Power 
Company (COPCO) in Klamath Falls, which was connected to Bonneville's 
transmission system. IS 
The Northwest's Congressional delegation and state governors responded to 
the potential intertie by quickly mobilizing against it. At issue was the previously 
unanticipated application of the "preference clause" in the BPA's authorizing charter, 
which required that public utilities have first call on power ~arketed by Bonneville. 
More to the point, many Northwestern politicians were worried that if California's 
public utilities were able to gain access to the Northwest's grid, either as recipients of 
13 Floyd E. Dominy, "A New Power Giant Materializes on the West Coast," Reclamation ERA 51:3 
(August 1965): 66 - 67. 
14 Prior to experiencing their first deficits in 1958, the BPA was $78,800,000 ahead in their repayment 
schedule of federal investments into the Columbia River Basin. By the end of fiscal year 1961, that 
surplus had been reduced to $37,800,000. According to Luce, "Future deficits are predicted for the next 
four or five years ... if this trend is not reversed, it will be difficult to avoid a rate increase." See "Power 
for Progress-II: The New Program ofBonneville Power Administration for the Pacific Northwest: 
Updated Summary ofSpeeches and Statements by Charles F. Luce, Bonneville Power Administrator 
(Compiled as ofMarch 30, 1962, and supersedes compilation dated July 15, 1961)," 4 - 5, Library of 
the Bonneville Power Administration. 
15 Gus Norwood, Powerfor the People, 240. 
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third-party energy transfers or by building connecting power lines on their own, than 
they could have, by law, demanded public preference to BPA power, at the expense of 
the Northwest's own private utilities and industries. Hearings were subsequently 
scheduled in the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee on April 8 and 9, 1959, 
and ultimately led to a resolution passed on May 19 that requested: 
That the Secretary of the Interior direct the Bonneville Power 
Administration to conduct, in cooperation with the Bureau of 
Reclamation, a study and analysis of the feasibility and desirability of a 
high-voltage interconnection for disposal of surplus secondary energy 
between the Federal power systems in the Pacific Northwest and 
California and report to the Congress thereon, together with 
conclusions and recommendations not later than July ·15, 1959... 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Committee request the 
Secretary of the Interior to suspend all negotiations for any 
interconnection or sale of surplus power until the Congress has had the 
opportunity to consider and act on the study and analysis requested by 
this situation. 16 
In February 1960, after a deadline extension, the BPA and Bureau of 
Reclamation reported their findings to the committee. After pointing out the 
Congressional direction to focus the analysis on "the disposal of surplus energy 
between the federal systems," Administrator Pearl relayed his agency's primary 
conclusion: "The study shows that little or no benefits result from the coordination of 
the Federal surplus secondary energy in the Pacific Northwest and the Central Valley 
system in northern California.,,!7 Even so, Pearl reported Bonneville's original 
16 "Conference regarding study of feasibility ofhigh voltage transmission interconnection between 
California and the Pacific Northwest," 9 - 10, June 25, 1959, PNW-PSW Intertie Documents, Box 
18118, RG 305, National Archives (pacific Alaska Branch, Seattle (hereinafter referred to as NARA 
Seattle). 
17 "Study ofa High Voltage Electrical Interconnection between the Pacific Northwest and California," 
February 1960, PNW-PSW Intertie Documents, Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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strategy to dispose of surplus power in California over copeo's 230-kv line was 
still sound: 
The study indicates feasibility of an interconnection for the sale of 
surplus secondary energy in California ... sold at delivery points in 
Oregon for use in Californian markets in the same manner as the 
Bonneville Power Administration now markets this type of surplus 
energy for use in Idaho, Montana, and British Columbia. 18 
Significantly, the report also clarified the question over claiming 
Bonneville's power outside of the Pacific Northwest by public preference 
customers, noting: "The Regional Solicitor's opinion indicates that preference 
customers in either the Pacific Northwest or California would have priority in 
the purchase ofboth firm and secondary energy over non-preference customers 
in either area." 19 
By the time the report was submitted to Congress, Oregon governor Mark 
Hatfield, Washington governor Albert Rosselini, and California governor Edmund 
Brown, had been working together for more than a year under the auspices of the 
Pacific Coast Governors Power Coordinating Committee and had commissioned an 
intertie study of their own. In order to keep the BPA-COPCO-PG&E intertie from 
moving forward, the governors asked the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in 
May and June to keep the BPA in check until their own study was concluded and they 
had been able to work up legislation to limit the preference rights of California's 
public agencies. As a result, the BP A's sale of surplus power to COPCO was shelved, 
i8 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
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1961.20 
and the committee requested the Secretary ofthe Interior to draft a regional 
preference bill for consideration by members of the Eighty-Seventh Congress in 
Importantly, the governors' study promoted the viability of a much larger 
interconnection, using two 500-kv interties to span the distance between the Columbia 
River and Bakersfield (in Southern California, near Los Angeles).21 Furthermore, the 
study commented favorably on the potential for the use of direct current (DC) lines 
rather than standard alternating current (AC) technology.22 Recent advances in high-
voltage DC (HVDC) transmission in Sweden created opportunities for the commercial 
application of the new technology for the transmission of electricity over long 
distances. The development ofmercury-arc valves in 1939 and silicon-controlled 
rectifiers (semi-conductors also known as thyristors) in the late 1950s allowed for the 
development of power lines capable of transmitting DC power hundreds ofmiles with 
significantly less line loss than with AC transmission. Because the HVDC lines were 
also able to use the earth for the return current, savings in power line and tower 
investments were substantial. When compared to extra-high voltage AC transmission, 
the longer the HVDC line, the bigger the savings. Those efficiencies were somewhat 
reduced with the necessary investments into terminal facilities, because HVDC is 
incompatible for residential and commercial uses unless converted into AC, but as 
long as transmission lines were planned with few or no turnouts (because each turnout 
20 Norwood, Power for the People, 241 - 242. 

21 The governors' study was conducted by H. Zinder & Associates, Inc. and submitted in September 

1960, with a revision in January 1961. 

22 Norwood, Powerfor the People, 241- 242. 
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required the construction of expensive terminal facilities), large savings could be 
gained.23 
By including Southern California into the intertie study, the governors' study 
identified far more opportunities for energy exchanges between the regions. The more 
expansive geography allowed for energy exchanges that would take advantage of the 
seasonal diversities between the regions and for a larger market area to absorb the 
BPA's surplus power. For example, increased use in air conditioning and water 
pumping during Southern California's long, hot summers was beginning to create an 
annual summer peak in the that region's electrical loads even by the late 1950s. In 
comparison, summers in the Northwest were mild, leading to annual lows in power 
usage at the same time the Columbia River Basin was swollen with snowmelt. 
For the Northwest, power usage peaked during the cold winters as people 
warmed their homes and businesses, but that peak in energy load occurred at the same 
time the region's power-producing rivers were at their lowest annual water flows. An 
intertie connecting the two regions would create an opportunity for a seasonally 
reciprocal exchange of energy, in which the Northwest would transmit hydropower 
south during the summers and California could send thermal-generated electricity 
north during the winters. 
Furthermore, because the Northwest's power systems were dominated by 
hydropower plants and Southern California's power systems were reliant on thermal 
23 For a thorough and technical evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages ofHVDC transmission, 
see Jos Arrilaga, High Voltage Direct Current Transmission} Second Edition (London, U.K.: Institution 
of Electrical Engineers, 1998); and K.R. Padiyar, HVDC Power Transmission Systems: Technology and 
System Interactions (New York: Wiley Press, 1990). 
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plants, there was an opportunity to rationalize production across both systems on a 
daily basis as well as a seasonal one. Because hydropower plants can produce energy 
almost as quickly as it takes to send water through their turbines, they are well 
designed to supply power during predictable daily peaks in power usage (at breakfast 
and dinner times). Thermal plants, on the other hand are most efficiently operated 
when allowed to run at a steady level of output, day in and day out. By connecting the 
two regions with an intertie, it would become possible to harness the peak power 
available in the Northwest to assist in the production ofpeak power throughout the 
whole system. To reciprocate, thermal plants could return off-peak power north (at 
night) to allow the region's reservoirs to be recharged for their use in providing peak 
power the next day. 
With the BPA hungry to open up power markets in the state of California, and 
PG&E (North America's largest private utility) looking to gain access to the 
Northwest's grid, it is no surprise that both regional and national attention would 
become focused on the implications that such interconnections raised. If the Pacific 
states were to allow their electrical grids to be linked together, just who would fmance, 
construct, own, and operate the interties? Furthermore, how many interties should be 
built? Where would they be located? How much energy would they transport? And, 
who would be the primary beneficiaries? Would California's public preference 
customers be able to gain first call on BP A power? It was the federal government, 
under the newly elected administration of President John F. Kennedy, that began· 
9 
sorting out the answers to these questions through the hands-on involvement of the 
BPA. 
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CHAPTER 2: Federal Leadership 
While the BP A was working to expand its markets southward, negotiations 
between the United States and Canada over the joint-development ofthe Columbia 
River, which had begun in 1944, were' finally beginning to bear fruit. On January 17, 
1961, the two countries signed a treaty that paved the way for the construction of three 
enormous storage dams in Canada and one in Montana. Collectively, these headwater 
dams promised to double the storage capacity of the Columbia River hydropower 
system.24 The increased upriver storage meant there would eventually be less surplus 
power for the BP A to market, because the surplus water would be stored in upriver 
reservoirs and be systematically released to meet needs year-round. Nonetheless, 
there would be substantial gains in both firm power and peaking power.25 
The success of the Columbia River Treaty negotiations, along with a well-
timed release that same January of California's intertie study, which endorsed the 
construction of two 500-kv AC interties between the regions, gave President Kennedy 
good cause to direct Stewart Udall, newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, "to 
develop plans for the early interconnection of areas served by that Department's 
marketing agencies with adequate common carrier transmission lines; to plan for 
24 Blumm, "The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage," 274 - 275. 

25 "Peaking power" refers to power generated in order to meet peak loads in daily energy uses, typically 

during breakfast and dinner times. 
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further national cooperative pooling of electric power, both public and private; and 
to enlarge such pooling as now exists.,,26 
In response to the President's directive, Secretary Udall and Assistant 
Secretary Kenneth Holum appointed a five-man task force, with the newly appointed 
BPA Administrator, Charles Luce, as its chairman, to study the feasibility of a Pacific 
Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie and provide recommendations within a year.27 
Udall gave them six guidelines for the study: 
1) Regional interties must be mutually beneficial to both regions; 
2) Regional protection legislation and contractual provisions should be 
enacted and drafted; 
3) British Columbia power should be given consideration for the 
Pacific Intertie; 
4) The effect of the Pacific Intertie on fossil fuel use should be taken 
into consideration; 
5) An economic evaluation should be taken into consideration; and 
6) Other interties should be studied later and the study should be 
confined to the Pacific Intertie marketing areas.28 
Worried that failure to build an intertie system would force the BP A to raise its rates 
and stall industrial development across the Northwest, Udall made a point to the task 
force that they "should consider this work of the very highest priority ... and their 
26 Memo from Charles Luce and Stewart Udall to All Interested Parties, March 21, 1961, PNW-PSW 
Intertie (Jan. 1961 to April 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
27 The appointment of Charles Luce as BP A Administrator signified a shift in BPA priorities beyond the 
creation ofthe Pacific Intertie (See Norwood., Power for the People; Springer, Power and the Pacific 
Northwest; and Tollefson, BPA and the Strugglefor Power at Cost). The other members of the task 
force were Milton A. Chase, General Engineer from the office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Water and 
Power Development in Washington, D.C.; Morgan D. Dubrow, Assistant and ChiefEngineering 
Research Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Water and Power Development; Hugh P. Dugan, 
Regional Director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Sacramento office; and Bernard Goldhammer, 
Power Manager for the BP A in Portland. 
28 Luce and Udall to all interested parties, March 21, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1961 to April 
1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. Point No.6 likely relates to an ongoing investigation by 
the BPA and Bureau ofReclamation (Region II) to build a Pacific Northwest-Missouri River Basin 
(east-west) intertie to take advantage of time zone diversities for the supply of peak power. 
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immediate assistants should spend full time or whatever time is necessary to 
produce by May 1 a preliminary report. ,,29 
The Task Force followed Udall's recommendations closely and quickly began 
soliciting data from California's water ~d power agencies, city governments, and 
public and private utilities for use in their feasibility study. By May 1, they submitted 
their preliminary report to Udall, recommending "the construction as soon as possible, 
under government leadership, of full scale test installations of high voltage DC 
terminal equipment and a substantial length of line.,,30 If Bonneville was going to 
commit the federal government's resources toward the construction of a DC intertie 
potentially bridging almost 900 miles of the Pacific West, it was no surprise that they 
would want to begin running tests on the reliability of the technology. 
By June, the task force also began distributing a draft of a regional preference 
bill to all of the BPA's customers, the public and private utilities in California, 
governors of the Pacific Coast states, appropriate state agencies, and other interested 
groups such as chambers of commerce and trade and industrial associations. 
Essentially, the early drafts defined the "Pacific Northwest" as: 
the states ofOregon and Washington, the State ofMontana west of the 
Continental Divide, and such portions of the States ofNevada, Utah, 
and Wyoming within the Columbia drainage basin and of the State of 
Idaho as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be 
29 Memo from Stewart Udall to Kenneth Holum, Charles Luce, Floyd Dominy, and john Kelly, March 
24, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1961 to April 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. Udall 
also asked that the task force draft a regional preference bill and circulate it for comment. 
30 Intertie Task Force, "Progress Report ofMay I, 1961, Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest 
Interconnection," 3, PNW-PSW lntertie Documents, Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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within the marketing area of the Federal Columbia River power system,31 
Although the core text of the bill addresses the sale of "surplus power" 
potentially available from the region's hydropower plants, the wording of the 
bill-even in the title-specifically identifies the power in question as 
"electrical power or energy of any kind generated at Federal plants in the 
Pacific Northwest for use outside of...the Pacific Northwest" as being subject 
to its provisions. Additionally, the bill forwarded a principle of reciprocal 
returns, in which. 
surplus electric energy generated at Federal plants in the Pacific 

Northwest which caD be conserved ...may be sold or exchanged 

on a provisional basis under contracts providing ... the purchaser 

will return the full amount of energy delivered to 

him... including transmission and head losses, as may be 

required for use within the Pacific Northwest. 32 

In the cover letters that accompanied the regional preference drafts, Luce also 
included a boilerplate paragraph that made sure to highlight the fact that this 
legislation was in no way intended to expand Bonneville's marketing boundaries. In 
fact, as of 1961, there were no specified geographical boundaries to BPA's marketing 
ofpower, something Luce made sure each reader ofthe bill understood at the onset. 
Specifically, he pointed out: 
One thing should be clearly understood about the enclosed draft of 
legislation: It does not enlarge the present authority of Bonneville to 
market electrical energy outside the Pacific Northwest. To the 
contrary, it substantially restricts our present authority. Under existing 
31 A Bill to guarantee consumers in the Pacific Northwest first call on electric energy generated at 

Federal plants in that region, Draft dated June 26, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (May 1961 - June 1961), 

Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

32 Ibid The regional preference draft explicitly exempted any Canadian power stemming from the 

Columbia River Treaty from the provisions of the bill. 
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F ederallaw, Bonneville has authority to market power to anyone, with 
preference to public agencies and cooperatives, any where within 
economic transmission distance.33 
Luce also routinely pointed out to interested parties in the Northwest that regardless of 
whether or not any such legislation were passed, more interconnections, such as the 
then-suspended line between PG&E and COpeD, could be exp~cted in the future. 34 
In response to the task force's call for comments, more than thirty-five parties 
responded. For the most part, Northwestern groups were in favor ofthe need for such 
legislation, even if they recommended revisions. There were Northwestern groups 
that opposed the need for preference legislation, but they were usually against the 
whole idea of any power transfers out of the Northwest at all. The Washington State 
Sportsman Council, for example, passed a formal resolution against the Pacific 
Intertie, worried that increased pressure by electrical customers from beyond the 
region, particularly in California, would make conditions for the region's already 
decimated salmon populations even worse.3S The Snohomish Tribes, which formally 
and unanimously endorsed the resolution of the Washington State Sportsman Co.uncil, 
also protested the construction of the intertie system in a June 9 letter to Udall: 
Whereas we Indians feel we have too many power dams blocking our 
streams to migratory salmon and such an intertie will eventually call for 
more dams as increased demand for more power in the future. We feel 
that no such power intertie contract or agreement should be entered into 
without a guarantee that no further power dams be built. However, we 
feel that power generated by coal mined from our local mines could be 
33 For copies of relevant correspondence see mUltiple letters sent by Charles Luce to various interested 
parties during early June, PNW-PSW Intertie (May 1961 to June 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA 
Seattle. 
34 Jbid. 
35 Hank Hawkins, Snohomish Tribe of Indians, to Stewart Udall, June 9, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie 
(May 1961 to June 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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used for this proposed Intertie that we Indians still feel that we should have a 
guarantee that no more power dams shall be built. 36 
Udall assured them that "the Interior Department has launched a crash program of 
fishery research to determine the effect ofdams on the fishery resource.,,37 
Luce responded to what appeared to be a minority of opposition in the 
Northwest by reminding them that PG&E had already been working on a plan to 
connect their power grid with the BPA's along the Oregon-California border. He then 
raised the possibility of a public utility or a power-hungry municipality like Los 
Angeles gaining access to the Northwest's hydropower as a preference customer. 
Luce reminded them that Bonneville was committed to helping protect the interests of 
the Northwest with some form of regional preference before constructing any interties. 
But, he warned detractors that "Interties are here to stay-either we in the Pacific 
Northwest must devise a way to take advantage of interties, or interties will take 
advantage of us.,,38 
Comments on the preference bill from interested parties in California were 
mixed, and many comments focused primarily upon the Intertie itself and much less so 
on the regional preference draft bill. Some respondents, like the Merced Irrigation 
District, worried that the sale of the BPA's surplus power would only delay "much 
needed water development" in the state. They were "opposed to the importation of 
36 Snohomish Tribe of Indians to Stewart Udall, June 9, 1961, PNW -PSW Intertie (May 1961 to June 

1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

37 Udall to Hawkins, July 12, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (May 1961 to June 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, 

NARA Seattle. The "crash program" must have been in reference to the federal hatchery program. 

38 Summary Statement by Charles F. Luce, Bonneville Power Administrator, of remarks before 

California Intertie Panel at Annual Convention of Inland Empire Waterways Association, Spokane, 

Washington, Oct. 24, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961 to Dec. 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA 

Seattle. 
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electric power that would compete with the power we are now selling and propose 
to sell to support our water development projects.,,39 Other groups-most notably the 
Northern California Municipal Electric Association, the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power, and the California Department of Water Resources-pointed out 
that regional preference should only be given to power generated from the 
Northwest's hydropower plants, not to thermal or non-federally produced power .. 
They also felt .that the bill did not treat the two regions equitably and that the 
requirements to return power during off-peak hours wholly excluded non-power 
producing agencies from participating altogether, even though they might be interested 
in purchasing peak power.40 California's Department of Water Resources also pointed 
out that "state boundaries should not be permitted to form a bar to sensible and 
economic utilization of electric energy resources.,,41 
Still, California's public power agencies were most definitely interested in 
obtaining available power from the Northwest and were attracted to the promise a 
larger marketing area for power generated from their own power plants. F or example, 
California's Department of Water Resources noted that they would like to be able to 
market electricity from their Oroville plant in the Southern California energy market. 
39 Kenneth R. McSwain, Merced Irrigation District, to Bernard Goldhammer, July 6, 1961, PNW-PSW 
Intertie (May 1961 to June 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
40 See David Koester, President ofNorthern California Municipal Electric Association, to Charles Luce, 
July 21, 1961; Ivan Bateman, Chief Electrical Engineer and Assistant Manager, Los Angeles Water and 
Power, to R.C. Price, Acting Director, California Department of Water Resources, July 21, 1961; and 
R.C. Price, to Charles Luce, July 21, 1961; all in PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1961 - Aug. 1961), Box 

18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. SMUD, for example, would have had to build its own thermal plant to 

participate in the power exchanges proposed by the BP A-unless they were able to draft a workable 

arrangement with PG&E to return energy associated with peaking capacity. 

41 Price to Luce, July 21, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Ju1y 1961- Aug. 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, 

NARA Seattle. 
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Although there was some interest for both peak and firm power by various public 
agencies across California, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) and 
L.A.'s Department ofWater and Power (two of the state's biggest public power 
brokers) specifically stated that they would primarily be interested in an arrangement 
that allowed them to import Northwestern power during the summer months for an 
equitable return ofpower during the winter months. And, while they were interested 
in the delivery of some peak power, they were especially interested in the opportunity 
to add more firm power to their systems.42 
The private utilities in California were much less enthused about the idea of the 
federal government building any extra-high-voltage power lines across their own 
marketing territories. Three of the state's largest electrical companies-San Diego 
Gas and Electric, California Electric Power, and Southern California Edison­
submitted a joint letter in response to the BP A'scalI for comment that argued for the 
abandonment of the Pacific Intertie endeavor altogether, stating: 
In view of the uncertain and speculative nature of the premises 
involved, and based upon our experience in the electric utility business, 
at the present time we do not believe it is possible to arrive at a 
favorable cost-benefit ratio for a twin-circuit EHV [Extra-High­
Voltage] transmission line between the Northwest and California which 
would survive an objective engineering analysis.43 
And as far as the regional preference draft was concerned, the companies 
believed: 
42 William Warne, Director, California Department ofWater Resources, to Bernard Goldhammer, Aug. 
7, 1961; Conference report from Bernard Goldhammer to Charles Luce regarding Aug. 7, 1961 meeting 
in San Francisco with preference customers of California; Aug. 16; both from PNW~PSW Intertie (July 
1961- Aug. 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
43 Presidents of Southem California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, and 
California Electric Power Company, to Charles Luce, Sept. 22, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961 -
Dec. 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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Protective legislation proposed by the Northwest would subject export of 
firm power to relatively short notices ofwithdrawal [stated in the draft 
as seven days], which would seriously limit the effective life ofthe 
large investment in the proposed tie line as a source ofprospective firm 
power for California.44 
California's private power companies did not want any federal intrusion into 
their marketing territories. Regardless ofhow well the regional preference draft was 
written, their ideological 'opposition to a federal intertie would not change. In their 
efforts to derail the federal government's plans to authorize and fund a publicly owned 
transmission system that crossed through their territories, California's private utilities 
began pooling power across their own systems. In the process, they started to create a 
more integrated electrical grid for the state, one they hoped would nullify the 
justification for any federally constructed intertie. But, if they were to blunt the efforts 
of the Department of Interior to build a federally owned intertie across California, they 
would have to establish plans for an intertie system that were on par with what the 
Luce's Intertie Task Force was in the process of developing in 1961. 
44 Ibid. 
17961 '0£ ~unf '/vU.lnof uo3a.lO '!n~UOH I.rnJ Aq ,,'WtU~Old SS~lIl!d" :17 ~lM!d 
oz 

21 
CHAPTER 3: The Federal Yardstick 
In mid-December 1961, Luce's task force submitted its completed intertie 
report to Secretary Udall, concluding that the Pacific Intertie would be "such a good 
deal for the Northwest that the protective legislation should be passed and an Intertie 
constructed as quickly as possible." Through its report, the task force demonstrated 
their willingness to move forward on the project regardless of stated opposition from 
California's private electrical companies. The report subsequently called for the 
construction of an initial 750-kv DC connection stretching from The Dalles Dam on 
the Columbia River, through Tracy, California, to Los Angeles, with the capacity to 
deliver between 650,000 and 900,000 kilowatts (kw). Importantly, the task force 
pointed out that this recommendation was feasible even without the participation of 
private utilities in any energy exchanges, and was designed specifically to provide 
California's public agencies with power.45 If, however, California's private utilities 
decided to participate in the operation of the Pacific Intertie, then "the task force 
recommended there be two d-c lines, or two 500 kv a-c lines, or three 345 kv a-c lines, 
in that order ofpreference." Additionally, if both the public and private power 
interests in California decided to participate and Canada agreed to sell their treaty-
based power over the intertie, "the task force recommended, first, three d-c lines and, 
second, three 500 kv a-c lines ...with a capacity of about 2,500,000 kw.,,46 
4S Teletype from Charles Luce to George Toman, BPAAssistant Manager, Washington, D.C. office 
(regarding pre~s release for Dec. 20), Dec. 18, 1961, PNW -PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961 - Dec. 1961), Box 
18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
46 Ibid. 
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The creation of a formal plan for a federally constructed Pacific Intertie 
would serve as a yardstick for the evaluation of all proposals in economic costs and 
engineering efficiencies that would eventually be submitted to the Intertie Task Force 
for consideration.47 Immediately, however, the federal yardstick established 
considerable leverage to move all non-federal parties into meaningful negotiations 
with the BPA; otherwise, the private utilities risked the chance ofhaving the federal 
plan imposed on their territories. The disincentive for not participating was greater 
than the risks associated with compromises likely to result from a public-private 
partnership in the planning, construction, operation, and control of the intertie. 
The federal government's commitment to the construction ofat least one DC 
leg of the Pacific Intertie, in part, demonstrates the importance placed on the 
development of the nation's energy infrastructure during the Cold War. 48 The Soviets 
had already undertaken an effort to build a 300-mile-Iong HVDC intertie.49 The 
United States was poised to do better. A DC line stretching almost 800 miles would 
demonstrate to the world that that Americans were superior in DC transmission. Even 
more, Udall believed that DC technology held "exciting promise" on the domestic 
47 The yardstick principle was established during the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and made public in a speech delivered in Portland, Oregon, on September 21, 1932. See Ogden, "The 
Development of Federal Power Policy in the Pacific Northwest," 146. . 
48 Evidence of Soviet-American competition in the field of long-distance electrical transmission 
surfaces repeatedly throughout the negotiations related to the construction of the Pacific Intertie system 
(at local, regional, national, and international levels) and could be the focus of an independent historical 
analysis. It is highly likely that future scholarship on the creation of the Intertie will detennine that the 
integration of high voltage direct current technology into the western grid was directly related to 
technological competition with the Soviets. Regardless, attention to the Cold War nexus of politics, 
ideology, science, and technology has subsequently been avoided in this thesis. 
49 Charles Luce to W. A. Van Allen, Apr. 4, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Apr. 1962 - Dec. 1962), Box 
18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. According to Luce, the Soviet's Stalingrad-Donbass line was likely "a 
prototype installation to develop and refme the terminal equipment and d-c transmission techniques." 
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front as well, foreseeing the potential for the Pacific states and the Missouri River 
Basin to tap the hydropower potential ofAlaska and the Yukon, for the cities ofNew 
York, Philadelphia, and Boston to benefit from interties linking them directly to mines 
in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and for Detroit and Chicago to gain similar 
benefits from DC interties connecting those cities to mines in North Dakota and 
Montana.50 
All told, there were eight alternative transmission plans included in the task 
force's report on the Pacific Intertie. According to Luce, "In addition to being self-
liquidating [over its fifty-year lifespan] and producing a profit for BPA, the Intertie 
would permit savings in plant investment in the two regions greater than the cost of 
the lines." For the BPA's grid, the intertie would not only provide a market for the 
sale of a considerable amount of secondary power, but also promise the availability of 
even a modest amount of thermal power (estimated at roughly 23,000 kw during the 
"early years") from the Southwest to firm up a large amount ofpower (approximately 
400,000 kw) in the Northwest.51 
The Intertie Task Force was convinced that the exchange ofpower between the 
regions was a winning proposition all around. Not only would each region be able to 
save an estimated $90 million on plant investments to provide for future peak power 
needs, but the intertie would also pay for itself and even provide a profit for the BPA, 
which would help it pay down the debt accrued during the construction of the 
50 Teletype from Luce to Toman, Dec. 11, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961- Dec. 1961), Box 

18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

51 Teletype from Luce to Toman, Dec. 18, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961- Dec. 1961), Box 

18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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Columbia River hydro system. Even so, the task force recommended that Congress 
only appropriate funds "for the designing and planning of the intertie during the 
following year and delay the appropriation of construction funds until Congress was 
able to pass a regional preference bill. ,,52 
Not surprisingly, California's private utilities were less enthusiastic about the 
report. Southern California Edison immediately issued a response to the press stating 
that the project was absolutely unnecessary because the state's private utilities had 
already devised a plan to build their own intertie without any investment by the 
nation's taxpayers.53 Within weeks of the task force's report,California's private 
utilities also announced the formation of the "California Power Pool," which 
combined the resources ofPG&E, San Diego Gas and Electric, California Electric 
Power, and Southern California Edison into a unified voice ofopposition against a 
publicly owned and operated intertie system. In addition to their intent to defeat any 
Congressional approval for a federal intertie, the California Power Pool also 
announced their decision to submit a proposal to the BP A for a more viable alternative 
involving the construction ofprivately owned and operated intertie lilies in 
California.S4 
S2 Ibid 
53 W.A. Van Allen to Charles Luce, March 13, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1962 - Mar. 1962), Box 
18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
54 "Third Northwest Line to Strengthen Power Interchange: 4 Utilities Sign Statewide Power Pool 
Pact," PG&E Progress 29:2 (Feb. 1962): 1, in PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1962 - Mar. 1962), Box 18118, 
RG 305, NARA Seattle. The three lines noted in the title of the article refer to the proposed PG&E­
PP&L line, an existing 220-kv line between PG&E and Southern California Edison, and a 500-kv line 
being studied by the newly formed California Power Pool. During the course of the negotiations over 
the Pacific Intertie, the California Power Company was bought out by Southern California Edison 
(officially merged on January 1, 1964). 
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On January 5, 1962, soon after the California Power Pool announced it 
would be devising its own intertie proposal, PG&E and Pacific Power and Light 
(PP&L)-the Northwestern electrical company that merged with COPCO in 1961­
signed a contract indicating that they would continue moving forward with plans to 
interconnect their electrical systems across the Oregon-California border, regardless of 
political opposition to the BPA's sale ofelectricity out of the region. PG&E even 
attempted to revive negotiations with the BPA over the purchase of secondary energy 
via the lines ofPP&L and the yet-to-be built AC line crossing the state line to PG&E's 
facilities at Round Mountain in California. BP A Administrator Charles Luce quickly 
indicated that, while he was willing to discuss the terms for the transfer of energy 
between the two systems, he "could make no commitment until Congress had acted 
upon the regional preference legislation.,,55 Once the contract between the two private 
utilities was made official, the BPA "indicated publicly that [while] this line could 
serve as one of the several proposed ... it does not eliminate the need for the other lines 
. recommended in the report. ,,56 
The private utilities' efforts to create a "small" 110-mile intertie between their 
systems continued to be fought over throughout the remainder of the year. By January 
1963, the U.S. Forest Service, which had delayed the construction process through a 
year-long environmental impact study, had denied the companies' application for 
right-of-way. Additionally, the regional office ofthe Forest Service in San Francisco 
SS Memo from Charles Luce to Assistant Secretary for Water and Power, Jan. 18, 1962, PNW-PSW 

Intertie (Jan. 1962 Mar. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

56 Warren Marple, BPA Program Coordinator, to Carl Miller, Feb. 26, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 

1962 - Mar. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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recommended that the "request be approved for an alternate route farther to the 
east... paralleling an existing natural gas pipe1ine.,,57 Importantly, this delay and 
eventual denial of right-of-way and the resulting delays in construction of the privately 
built and operated intertie between the regions helped strengthen the BPA's leverage 
for ongoing Pacific Intertie negotiations through 1962 and into 1963. Had PG&E 
been able to begin transferring power between regions in 1963, the economic 
feasibility of the federal intertie program would have certainly have been diminished. 
An existing privately controlled intertie would not only have unloaded some power 
from the publicly-owned lines, which would have affected the repayment of accrued 
debts in their construction and operation, but it would have also set a strong precedent 
for the private construction and operation of other proposed intertie lines. The line 
may have also placed PG&E in the powerful position of electrical toll-gate operator, 
something Luce did not want because "most of the profits from such an intertie would 
accrue to the private utility rather than to Bonneville and the United States 
Treasury.,,58 
While the drama over the building of the 11 O-mile privately owned intertie 
played on, the BP A continued to work with the rest ofthe parties interested in 
constructing portions of the Pacific Intertie system, essentially as it had been 
envisioned in the December 1961 Task Force Report. During the remainder of 1963, 
interested parties began consulting with the BP A in earnest to craft proposals to build 
57 Warren Marple to Charles Luce, conference report regarding Jan. 16, 1963 meeting with Forest 

Service, San Francisco Office, Jan. 17, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, 

RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

58 Luce to Van Allen, April 4, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Apr. 1962 - Dec. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, 

NARA Seattle. 
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and operate individual portions of the system. The first party to officially submit a 
proposal to the BP A (on December 28, 1962) was the Maryland-based International 
Utilities. Their involvement in the Pacific Intertie grew from considerable subsidiary 
interests in Western Canada's gas and electric systems. According to International 
Utilities' vice president, John M. Seabrook, "a strong direct tie between the Colorado 
River, the Columbia River, and eventually the Peace River would have all sorts of 
advantages." The biggest advantage for International Utilities was, of course, being 
able to profit from power transferred between Western Canada and the Western 
United States, particularly the energy markets of Southern California. 59 
International Utilities submitted a proposal to construct a DC intertie that 
would stretch from The Dalles through Nevada to Southern California. They were 
committed to privately financing the DC intertie and using it to transport power 
between buyers and sellers on each end of the line. According to their proposal, 
"International Utilities would merely transport, for a charge under a contract for line 
capacity, power which had been sold and purchased by others ....We would consider 
giving the contractors the right to purchase the line after an agreed upon period." The 
cost to parties using the line was left fairly vague in their original proposal, only 
indicating "charges set forth in the contract would be based upon the revenue 
requirements of International Utilities. ,,60 
59 John Seabrook, Vice President of International Utilities, to Charles Luce, Jan. 24, 1963, PNW-PSW 

Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

60 Seabrook to Luce, Dec. 28, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, 

NARA Seattle. 
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The next proposal, submitted to the BPA (on January 11, 1963) was from 
the California Power Pool. According to the Power Pool, they were in an ideal 
position to construct any portion of the Pacific Intertie that crossed California soil 
because their member companies "own and operate nearly three million kilowatts of 
hydroelectric generating capacity and ten million kilowatts of thermal electric 
generating capacity. This is approximately 65% of the hydro and 80% of the thermal 
capacity in California. ,,61 The Power Pool proposed to build two extra-high voltage 
(EHV) AC transmission lines (at 500 kv each), in stages, stretching southward 650 
miles from PG&E's Round Mountain facilities in Northern California. Their 
construction schedule indicated that the first of their AC interties would reach PG&E's 
Feather River lines by 1965, the San Francisco Bay area by 1966, and the Los Angeles 
area by 1967. As the line was extended, its operating capacity would increase in step, 
with the companies able to draw 400,000, 600,000, and 900,000 kw respectively at 
each phase in construction. Importantly, the proposal called for the BPA to sell all 
power being transferred over the intertie directly to Power Pool members at the 
California state line. They claimed "such sale ofBonneville power to Pool members 
will prevent any preference rights to Bonneville power from extending south of the 
border. This will eliminate any need for the proposed Northwest protective legislation 
which was before Congress in 1962." As to costs, the Power Pool committed itself to 
charging public agencies within California the same rate that the BP A would charge 
61 Robert Gerdes (Executive Vice President ofPG&E), lK. Horton (President ofSouthern California 
Edison), H.D. Dillin (President ofSan Diego Gas & Electric), and Fred Oldendorf, Jr. (President of 
California Electric Power Company), to Charles Luce, Jan. II, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 ­
Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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over a federal intertie, "with appropriate adjustment for any agreed upon support 
provided by Pool members.,,62 
The Power Pool detailed seven advantages that their privately constructed and 
operated system would have over a federal intertie. These arguments were similarly 
outlined in a January 14 press release titled "Utilities Offer Plan to Save U.S. 
Millions," and they were no doubt used time and again in their lobbying efforts at 
local, state, regional, and federal levels. 
1. 	 The Federal Government would save capital outlay ofnot less than 
$100 million and up to $245 million for transmission and substation 
facilities in California; 
2. 	 Federal, state, and local tax revenues would be increased by at least 
$110 million during the 20-year contract period; 
3. 	 Virtually all the California power market would be made available 
for disposal of surplus Northwest power; 
4. 	 Revenues from sales of surplus power to California would accrue to 
Bonneville at a much earlier date and be available in maximum 
amounts to reduce Bonneville deficits; 
5. 	 Northwest power consumers would be protected in their use of 
Bonneville power without the necessity for enactment of the 
controversial Northwest protective legislation; 
6. 	 The California Water Plan and the participation of local public 
agencies in California would benefit from the support of the 
combined generation and transmission systems of the California 
Power Pool; and 
7. 	 More complete integration ofpower resources within California 
and better coordination between electric systems in both regions 
would assure the lowest cost to power consumers and taxpayers. 63 
A third proposal was submitted to the BP A by Oregon-based Portland General 
Electric (PGE) on January 28. Under this proposal, PGE offered to build a 180-mile 
portion of a 500-kv AC line that stretched between their Round Butte hydropower 
62 Ibid The Round Mountain station was the intended southern terminal for the IIO-mile intertie 
already contracted for construction by PG&E and PP&L across the California-Oregon border. 
63 Ibid. 
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project on the Deschutes River to a yet-to-be-built PP&L substation east of Klamath 
Falls, the northern terminus of the proposed 110-mile PO&E and PP&L line. POE 
indicated that it "would make available to the BP A one-half of the capacity of this line 
for $865,000 per year, which we estimate would be BPA's cost under Federal 
construction and operation.,,64 
Washington's Grant County Public Utility District (PUD) also submitted a 
proposal to the BPA on January 28. Not providing any specific details, the Grant 
County PUD seemed to be putting their hat into the ring in case plans for the Pacific 
Intertie were expanded to include a tie line in the state of Washington. According to 
their proposal, "this district wishes to propose that it will construct, individually or in 
conjunction with other public agencies, that portion of the AC or DC transmission line 
or lines in the State of Washington, together with the necessary terminal facilities at 
the suitable point of interconnection with the Bonneville System. ,,65 
The next proposal to build a portion ofthe Pacific Intertie was submitted by 
Northwest Intertie, Inc., an Oregon-based non-profit corporation formed in April 1962 
and owned by rural electrical cooperatives. Northwest Intertie believed it could build 
a DC leg of the Pacific Intertie that stretched from the Columbia River (likely from the 
proposed John Day Dam) to Los Angles for an estimated cost of $60 million, but this 
price did not include any of the costs associated with the installation of terminal 
facilities at either end of the line. If either the BPA or city of Los Angeles did not 
64 Frank Warren, President ofPGE, to Charles Luce, Jan. 28, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963­
Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

65 Bernard Goldhammer to All BPA Customers, Feb. 1, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 

1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. Since no tie lines were constructed in Washington as part 
of the formal plans for the Pacific Intertie, this proposal was essentially shelved and not revisited. 
31 
wish to build the necessary terminals, for any reason, then Northwest Intertie 
offered to construct them for an estimated cost of $30 million each. The route for their 
proposed line crossed central Oregon, northwestern Nevada, and then entered 
California through the Owens Valley before continuing south to Los Angeles. As the 
second proposal submitted for construction of a DC line, their plan stood as direct 
competition for the offer by International Utilities.66 
While Northwest Utilities was certainly interested in assuring that the West's 
electrical cooperatives and publicly owned utilities were directly served by power over 
the Pacific Intertie, the rhetoric oftheit proposal was couched in the language of the 
Cold War. Promising to operate the intertie "without profit and in the public interest," 
they believed the project provided "an effective challenge to the Communist bid for 
supremacy in the development ofhigh voltage long distance direct current 
transmission of electricity.,,67 According to their president, Ivan C. Laird: 
Electric transmission is one of the prime tools of industrial and military 
strength. There could be no better method for meeting the Soviet 
challenge than a joint effort by the Federal Government, the largest 
municipal electric system in the United States and a private corporation 
that represents over 75,000 of the most dedic·ated ex~onents of free 
enterprise and individual initiative in the free world. 8 
The sixth and final proposal submitted to the BP A (on January 31, 1963) was 
from PP&L. By then, their plans to build a 110-mile stretch ofintertie in conjunction 
with PG&E were already familiar to the BPA, having been an ongoing affair for five 
years. Still, their proposal formally integrated the original flash-point of controversy 
66 Ivan Laird, President ofNorthwest Intertie, to Charles Luce, Jan. 31, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 
1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
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over the interconnection of the electrical systems of the Pacific Northwest and 
California into the planning for the Pacific Intertie. While the two companies were 
moving forward with the expectation that their intertie connection would initially be 
limited to a 230-kv AC intertie, their plans were to construct it so that the line could be 
operated at 500 kv in the near future.69 
Once the proposals were all in hand, the BP A began drafting contracts with 
each of the six interested parties in order to obtain more detailed information about the 
construction and operation of each proposed portion of the Pacific Intertie system. 70 
Through the process ofcontract negotiations, the BP A expected to gain· a much more 
reliable idea of each plan. Once the drafts were completed-and the advantages, 
disadvantages, and costs were clarified-each proposal would then be compared to the 
federal yardstick. Luce and his staff made the negotiation ofcontracts a high priority 
in order to help prepare for House appropriation hearings scheduled for April 1963.71 
As the contract negotiations got underway, the BPA also received word that 
Arizona's utilities were interested in the idea of a second DC leg of the intertie that 
would directly connect Hoover Dam to the Pacific Northwest's grid, likely at a 
terminal located near The Dalles or John Day dams. In order to determine whether 
69 E. Robert De Luccia, Vice-President and Chief Engineer ofPP&L, to Charles Luce, Jan. 31, 1963, 
PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
70 One more (informal) proposal was received by the BPA in February. It was submitted by Harvey 
Aluminum, a California-based company (with a plant in The Dalles, Oregon) primarily interested in 
building the DC line for an unspecified engineering fee and what seemed to be an arrangement that 
would allow them to provide all the aluminum for the poles and wires. The Harvey Aluminum 
proposal was not seriously considered by the Intertie Task Force in 1963. 
71 Minutes ofAdministrator's staff meetings, Volume 4: 1963 - 1964, Feb. 6, 1963, Library of the 
Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, Oreg. (hereinafter referred to as BPA Library); Charles 
Luce to Assistant Secretary of Water and Power, Feb. 5, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 
1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. The Sacramento and Denver offices of the Bureau of 
Reclamation worked with the BPA in the evaluation and drafting of the contracts. 
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this second DC intertie was both technically and economically feasible, Luce 
assigned BP A Power Manager Bernard Goldhammer with the task of studying the 
power needs and transmission capabilities ofArizona's utilities and electrical 
infrastructure. Luce also recommended to Assistant Secretary Holum that the BPA 
and Bureau ofReclamation "make a more intensive survey of the power markets in 
Nevada and Arizona," reasoning that subsequent studies might be used to formulate a 
formal proposal to Congress "that a Nevada routing be chosen for the EHV DC line in 
lieu of the routing suggested in the 1964 budget presentation of the Bonneville Power 
Administration and the Bureau ofReclamation."n 
By the early months of 1963, the federal government, largely through the 
hands-on leadership ofLuce, had done much to lay the groundwork for the creation of 
the Pacific Intertie. During 1961, following the orders ofPresident Kennedy and 
Secretary Udall, the BPA's task force circulated drafts of regional preference 
legislation, making amendments to it as comments were received from interested 
parties across the American West. By starting the process ofworking out the language 
and gaining support for a regional preference bill early, the BP A won over most of its 
customers in the Pacific Northwest. The early and wide distribution also helped raise 
the BP A's credibility among various Californian interests as well. As the planning for 
the Pacific Intertie continued to move forward, the BPA's continued insistence that the 
construction of the intertie system was politically dependent on the passage of some 
form of regional preference helped provide an incentive for all parties to work toward 
72 Kenneth Holum to Stewart Udall, Feb. 6, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 -, Mar. 1963), Box 
18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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compromise for regional protection. As it became more likely that a wealth of 
Canadian power (resulting from the Columbia River Treaty) might become available 
to the American West, the pressure to compromise on the regional preference bill 
increased. 
When the Intertie Task Force released its December 1961 report promoting the 
technological and economical feasibility of a federally constructed Pacific Intertie,. the 
BPA established a federal yardstick by which all other intertie proposals would be 
compared. In the subsequent negotiations with the California Power Pool, which 
derided the idea of federally owned interties across their marketing territories, the 
federal yardstick became a powerful tool for the BPA. The yardstick's effects were 
immediately visible in California, as the state's .private utilities coordinated their 
efforts to blunt the threat of federal intrusion. Initially, the federal plan gave cause for 
California's private utilities to integrate their electrical systems more fully. 
Secondarily, the yardstick forced the Power Pool to propose their own plan to 
construct and operate a north-south intertie system that operated to the benefit of both 
private and public interests alike-something likely not to have happened if not for the 
federal threat. 
Still, the effort to build the Pacific Intertie was strikingly different than the 
massive energy projects of the New Deal era The onset of the Cold War had given 
political capital to proponents of the free market system and critics of federal 
ownership ofany of the nation's non-governmental infrastructure. As the planning 
for the Pacific Intertie moved forward, both President Kennedy and members of 
35 
Congress required the'BPA to demonstrate that they were engaged in "good faith" 
negotiations with private interests willing to build any or all portions of the intertie 
system. It was not enough to lead the world in the creation and use of extra-high­
voltage electrical systems; the United States needed to show the world that its superior 
electrical grids were made possible through the benefits of a free enterprise system. 
In 1963 negotiations for the planning and construction, of the Pacific Intertie 
became increasingly bound to the fates of the regional preference bill and the 
Columbia River Treaty. In order for the intertie to be built, Congress had to pass 
regional preference legislation. As it happened, the fate of the Columbia River Treaty 
became similarly reliant on the successful passage of the regional preference bill, 
particularly since it was a precondition for the creation of the Pacific Intertie and the 
transmission ofCanadian (firm) power to the California market. Of course, if 
Canadian power was made available through the full ratification of the Columbia 
River Treaty, the federal yardstick for the Pacific Intertie would necessarily have to be 
modified to allow for at least three transmission legs between the Northwest and 
Southwest. In these negotiations, everyone stood to benefit. The BP A hoped to sell 
its secondary power south and use replacement (off-peak) power to firm up its 
electrical system. Interests south ofOregon stood to gain access to a considerable 
volume of energy that would not only firm up their electrical systems, but also help 
rationalize their own power production schemes. British Columbia, in turn, hoped to 
use the money from the sale of its treaty-related power entitlement to offset the cost of 
building three treaty-stipulated dams. 
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CHAPTER 4: Protecting Regional Interests 
Even before the BP A had begun drafting regional preference legislation in 
spring 1961, efforts had been underway to safeguard the Pacific Northwest's federally 
produced hydropower supply. In the wake of the BPA's suspended (1958) plans to 
transmit surplus energy to PG&E, the governors of Washington (Rosellini), Oregon 
(Hatfield), and California (Brown) signed a formal Statement ofAgreement on July 9, 
1959, designed to initiate the study of "legal arrangements (federal statute or interstate 
compact) which can assure that [public] preference clauses cannot apply inadvertently 
or by design to power purchased from the Pacific Northwest to California.,,73 At the 
federal level, the governor's efforts to craft some form of regional protection for the 
Northwest took the form ofS. 3880, which was introduced by Senator Hall Lusk (D­
OR) during the 86th Congress at the request of Governor Hatfield.74 While Congress 
adjourned before any hearings could be held on S. 3880, a resolution on June 21, 
1960, passed the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs requesting "the 
Secretary of the Interior to continue to suspend negotiations looking to the sale and 
transfer of surplus power or energy from the Pacific Northwest to California," 
effectively keeping the brakes on the transfer of any power between the regions. 75 
73 Statement ofAgreement Between the Governors of Washington, Oregon, and California on the 
Subject of the Proposed California Power Tie, July 9, 1959, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1963 - Dec. 
1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
74 Charles Luce to Robert Thornton, Attorney General ofOregon, April 12, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie 
(Apr. 1962 - Dec. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. Lusk introduced S. 3880 at the request 
of Oregon's Governor Mark Hatfield. 
75 Unsigned draft letter from Stewart Udall to Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, ca. mid-Dec. 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961 - Dec. 1961), Box 
18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
38 
Almost a full year passed before the BP A began widely distributing drafts of 
a new regional preference bill for comment, but by June 1961 the BPA had heard from 
thirty-five interested parties in the Pacific West states. While the majority of 
respondents in the Northwest understandably looked on the regional preference bill 
rather favorably, Californian interests were more critical. As could be expected, 
private interests were cold to the idea, particularly since it was being promoted by the 
BPA as a necessary precursor of the construction of any federally owned interties 
across their marketing territories. Not surprisingly, the Golden State's public utilities, 
whose interests in the Northwest's energy supplies were being negated by any 
legislation that would nullify the BPA's charter to provide a preference to publicly 
owned agencies, also offered some critical comment. 
The most common criticism leveled by California's public agencies was that 
the BP A's preference draft, as it was then written, placed restrictions on the sale of 
any power produced in the Pacific Northwest. The California Department of Water 
Resources, for example, found it "difficult to see the basis for including in the 
legislation provisions which would automatically establish corresponding limitations 
on thermal or non-Federally developed power.,,76 With many of California's public 
power agencies being dependent upon hydropower themselves-and some, like 
SMUD being wholly invested in hydropower production-a north-south intertie raised 
76 Reginald Price, Acting Director ofCalifornia Department of Water Resources, to Charles Luce, July 
21, 1961, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1961 - Aug. 1961), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle. The 
following organizations and city agencies were in agreement on this point: California Department of 
Water and Power, Northern California Municipal Electric Association, L.A. Department of Water and 
Power, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Roseville, Burbank, Pasadena, Riverside, Colton, 
Glendale, and the Anza Electric Co-op. 
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the hopes that they would be able to gain access to firm power available from 
Northwest producers. However, Luce was similarly interested in firming up the 
BPA's system with the addition of thermal power plants, most importantly through the 
commercial generation ofpower at the U.S. government's Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation in Eastern Washington. Not surprisingly, Luce leaned toward the 
inclusion of federally produced nuclear power in the regional preference legislation. 
Another oft-repeated criticism was leveled at the BP A's insistence that the 
energy sent between regions be a reciprocal exchange. The BP A wanted an assurance 
that its supply ofpeak power would only be made available to those parties who were 
able to arrange for an equal return ofoff-peak energy. For power producers whose 
production portfolios included thermal-generation power plants, this reciprocal 
exchange worked well, especially because thermal plants operated with greater 
efficiency when allowed to run at a steady level of output. But for utilities without 
any thermal-power capabilities, like SMUD, participation in energy exchanges with 
the BP A would be impossible unless they either built their own thermal plants or 
negotiated some kind of arrangement with another party (for SMUD, this would by 
necessity be PG&E) to reciprocate off-peak energy to the BPA. Additionally, 
managers at California's Department of Water Resources also felt that some of the 
BPA's peak power supply should be eliminated from mandatory reciprocation: 
It is unrealistic to require the return ofprovisional energy except during 
the storage release period in which it was delivered ... Under some 
conditions, energy furnished in association with peaking capacity 
should not be required to be returned ...energy associated with peaking 
capacity that could not have been conserved should not be subject to 
return, and, as suggested for provisional energy, a limit should be 
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placed on the elapsed time beyond which return of energy would not be 
mandatory.77 
On December 22, 1961, the BPA sent a draft of the regional preference bill to 
the Department of the Interior, and on January 19, it was submitted to Congress.78 At 
the same time that the draft was being readied for Congressional consideration, 
Oregon's Governor Hatfield and staff were working behind the scenes, through direct 
communication with Luce, to amend the bill without drawing attention to their efforts. 
According to Hatfield, "It has disturbed me... that there has never been a clean-cut 
attempt by the BPA or the DOl to straightforwardly tell the people of the Northwest 
that there is no possibility ofpermanent protection." Hatfield also pointed out "There 
is no provision that would prevent power from being offered for sale outside the 
Northwest at prices lower then those at which it could be offered within the 
Northwest." Furthermore, Hatfield believed the bill was flawed with unclear 
definitions and a lack of "definite standards to guide the Administrator. ,,79 
Luce responded to Hatfield by reminding him that while there were some 
similarities to the problems that could have grown out of the BPA-PG&E arrangement 
being considered in 1958, the situation had changed. Luce pointed out two important 
differences: 
77 William Warne, Director ofWater Resources at California Department of Water Resources, to 
Bernard Goldhammer, Nov. 17, 1961,.PNW-PSW Intertie (Sept. 1961- Dec. 1961), Box 18118, RG 
305", NARA Seattle. 
78 The draft submitted to Congress still applied to all federal projects in the Northwest, not just 
hydropower plants. 
79 Mark Hatfield to Charles Luce, Feb. 21, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1962 - Mar. 1962); Hatfield 
to Luce, Apr. 10, 1962, PNW -PSW Intertie (Apr. 1962 - Dec. 1962); both in Box 18118, RG 305, 
NARA Seattle. Apparently at Luce's request, Hatfield had "refrained from releasing [his staffs 
evaluation of the draft] report to the public, refrained from sending [Luce] a copy of the report and 
directed Mr. [Jonel] Hill [Oregon's Public Utility Director] to orally advise [Luce's] representatives of 
the specific objections. This was accomplished January 18, 1962." 
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1) 	 PG&E and PP&L are going to build such an interconnection regardless 
of Bonneville's approval; and 
2) 	 They are going to build a 500 kv line, having four times the 
capacity the 230 kv line pro~osed in 1960 [the year S. 3880 was 
introduced by Senator Lusk ]80 ' 
Addressing Hatfield's criticism regarding the BPA's failure to publicize the non-
permanency of the bill's safeguarding ofthe Northwest, Luce conceded: 
We do not, of course, pretend that the bill we have drafted is 
permanent...But the current bill, because of its requirement for 
incorporating a regional preference into contracts, assures protection to 
the region for a longer period than did the 1960 bills.81 
Luce then pressed Hatfield to lend his political support to the uphill struggle for the 

bill, pointing out, "Unless we can present a united front in our own region and with 

California, the chances of enactment will be very slim indeed. 82 

In 1962 several regional preference bills were introduced in the Interior 
Committees of the House and Senate: 1) S. 3153 (by Clinton P. Anderson, D-NM); 2) 
H.R. 11265 (by Gracie Pfost~ D-ID); and 3) H.R. 11264 (by Julia Butler Hansen, D­
WA). In the Senate, hearings were held on S. 3153 on May 21 and 22, leading to two 
. amendments to the bill. The first, and most important, was the BPA's decision to 
backpedal on its insistence that the preference legislation apply to all federally 
produced power. Limiting the bill to federal hydropower projects appeared to the 
BP A as a way to smooth the path for the support of California's congressional 
delegation. 
80 Luce to Hatfield, Mar. 22, 1962, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1962 - Mar. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, 
NARA Seattle. 
81 Ibid 

82 Ibid 
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Another amendment was added to the bill in order to blunt threatened 
opposition from Montana's congressional delegation. The exclusion of Eastem 
Montana in the bill's definition of the Pacific Northwest caused worries among many 
Montanans that the geographical preference already established for statewide priority 
access to power from the Hungry Horse Dam (located in northwestern Montana) 
would be negated. As that was not the intent of the bill, Luce saw no problem in 
seeing an amendment added to state, "nothing in this bill is to be construed as 
restricting or weakening the Hungry Horse reservation. ,,83 
In August, following the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of senators Barry 
Goldwater (R-AZ) and Karl Mundt (R-SD), who pushed for amendments extending 
the principle of regional preference to other major river basins in the country, the 
Senate approved the bill by a vote of 51 to 36.84 Once in the House, the bill never 
made it out ofcommittee, and the 87th Congress came to a close without any more 
85 progress. Soon after the 88th Congress commenced in 1963, a new round of regional 
preference bills were introduced: 1) H.R. 994 (by JUlia Butler Hansen, D-W A); 2) 
H.R. 1160 (by Alfred Westland, R-WA); H.R. 4071 (by Al Ullman, D-OR); H.R. 
4485 (by Compton White, D-ID); and S. 1007 (by Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA), 
Warren Magnuson (D-WA), Wayne Morse (D-OR), Maurine Neuberger (D-OR), 
83 S.R. Logan to Luce, April 24, 1962; Luce to Logan, April 27, 1962; both in PNW-PSW Intertie (Apr. 

1962 - Dec. 1962), Box 18118, RG 305, NARA Seattle; and Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and 

Response," 58. 

84 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 58. Mundt went further than Goldwater, 

Eushing for regional preference for "all federal energy," not just hydropower. 

5 Ibid., 59. 
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Frank Church (D-ID), Leonard Jordan (R·ID), Lee Metcalf (D-MT), and Mike 

Mansfield (D_MT).86 

Most important of all these bills was S. 1007, which was co-sponsored by all 
eight senators from Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. In April 1963 the 
Senate moved quickly to pass the legislation. After formally adopting the previously 
held Senate Interior Hearings ofMay 21, 1962 on S. 3153, the bill moved out of 
committee (on April 5) and was passed by the full Senate on April 23.87 Once in the 
House, the bill's momentum slowed. Northwestern governors pushed for the bill's 
. passage. Albert Rosellini, Governor ofWashington, for example, appeared before the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on May 14 in support ofS. 1007. He 
argued that the Bonneville Power Act of 1937, which limited the BPA's marketing 
area to those areas within "economic transmission distance" had become outdated with 
advances in technology. Rosellini pointed out to the committee that this definition 
"could encompass most ofour country situated west of the Mississippi River."ss With 
the majority of opposition to S. 1007 coming from California's congressional 
delegation, Oregon's Governor Hatfield attempted to enlist the aid of California's 
Governor Brown to persuade the bill's detractors to drop their protests. In a June 19 
letter, Hatfield suggested to Brown that his "support would undoubtedly do a great 
deal to accomplish the Intertie," but made sure to warn him that "without passage of 
86 Ibid., 73. Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA) was chair ofthe Senate Interior and Insular Affairs 

Committee, and Michael Mansfield (D-MT) was Senate Majority Leader during the 88th Congress. 

87 Ibid. 
88 Statement of Honorable Albert D. Rosellini, Governor of Washington, Before the House Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, May 14, in Support ofH.R. 1160, H.R. 4071, H.R. 4485 and S. 1007, 
PNW-PSW Intertie (Apr. 1963 -June 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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this regional preference legislation, the Northwest will of course be required to 
remain in opposition to any Intertie. ,,89 
On June 26, the effort to pass S. 1007 ground to a halt with the addition of an 
amendment by one of Washington's Republican representatives, Alfred Westland, 
which read: 
No electric transmission lines or facilities shall be constructed outside 
the Pacific Northwest by any Federal agency for the purpose of 
transmitting electric energy for sale or exchange pursuant to this Act 
except those lines and facilities hereafter specifically authorized by the 
Congress.90 
The amendment was popular to members of the House who suspected any federally 
owned intertie because they believed it smacked of socialism. However, for the BPA, 
though, whose negotiating position with California's private utilities relied largely 
upon their ability to move forward with a federal intertie system if they so desired, the 
amendment was a poison pill. Public utilities across the West immediately withdrew 
their support ofthe bill because of the Westland Amendment. Owen Hurd, Chairman 
of the Pacific Coast Coordinating Committee, which represented "175 consumer-
owned electrical systems in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, California, 
and Arizona," sent a telegram on July 8 to members of the House Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, arguing for the amendment to be stricken from the bill: 
Westland amendment would impede proper integration of 
existing federal systems for greatest return on taxpayers' dollar, 
drastically weakens government's negotiating position respecting 
possible non-federal Intertie proposals, jeopardizes chances for 
approval of the Canadian Treaty, and means higher costs for 
89 Mark Hatfield to Edmund Brown, June 19, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Apr. 1963 - June 1963), Box 

18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

90 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 75. 
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Northwest and Southwest consumers but lowers returns to the United States 
treasury. 
Westland amendment strengthens Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company's monopoly position, creates 'transmission tollgates' and 
endangers and weakens legislation to establish ground rules for any 
Pacific Northwest-Southwest Intertie.91 
On August 27, S. 1007 (with the Westland amendment) was brought to the floor for a 
two-hour debate and subsequently passed the House by a voice vote. By December 
the conference committee reported that it was unable to reach a compromise, and the 
two houses remained in stalemate until the summer of 1964.92 
As Douglas Norwood points out in "Administrative Challenge and Response," 
the primary issue leading to stalemate over the regional preference bill was not the 
principle of regional preference itself. The resistance in the House, rather, grew from 
ideological opposition to federal ownership ofthe Pacific Intertie. While the BPA was 
able to build a certain degree of consensus by conditionally linking the construction of 
the Pacific Intertie to the passage of a regional preference bill, the same linkage gave 
detractors an opportunity to force the BPA to continue negotiations with California's 
private utilities from a much less advantaged position than they otherwise would have 
had. Because S. 1007 stalled in 1963, the BPA was not able to appropriate funds to 
start construction of their intertie program in 1964. Without those funds, the BPA's 
leverage over California's private utilities was reduced in the subsequent negotiations 
over the intertie system. 
91 Teletype from Owen Hurd, Chairman ofPacific Coast Coordinating Committee, to James Carr, 

Under Secretary of the Interior, July 9, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1963 - Dec. 1963), Box 18119, 

RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

92 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 75 -76. 
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CHAPTER 5: Congressional Appropriations 
Throughout all of the negotiations surrounding the creation of the Pacific 
Intertie, the ownership and control of the transmission lines remained the most 
contested questions. Advocates ofpublic power fought for the construction of federal 
lines across California in order to break the virtual monopolies of the California Power 
Pool companies. Private utilities, likewise, fought against public ownership of the 
lines in order to maintain their monopolies and believed that power sold by publicly 
subsidized brokers, like the BPA, was artificially priced below market value and thus 
created unfair competition. Advocates for private construction agreed, but their 
protest of federal control extended beyond worries ofprofits or tax rolls. Many of the 
proponents ofa non-federal intertie distrusted federal ownership ofany of the 
country's infrastructure, particularly its electrical transmission systems, seeing such as 
a dangerous move toward socialism. hl contrast, the public agencies located at each 
end of the intertie had much to gain from the construction ofthe Pacific Intertie. The 
BPA hoped to get its budget back in the black, firm up their system by selling surplus 
power to Southern California, and exchange peak power for off-peak power. The City 
ofLos Angeles, in tum, needed an increasing amount of supplementary energy to 
power the pumps sending water hundreds ofmiles into the city, to satisfy its residents' 
needs for air conditioning, and to maximize the productivity of their own system 
through the exchange ofpeak and off-peak power with the north. 
48 
As controversy over the shape of the Pacific Intertie continued into 1963, 
various public agencies in central and northern California, and their supporters, 
became increasingly critical of the plans that did not include a federally owned line 
running south to Tracy, California. As they saw it, the benefits of the intertie were 
increasingly likely to be limited to the BPA, the California Power Pool, and the City 
of Los Angeles. Subsequently, their continued support for the project became linked 
to finding a way for the Pacific Intertie to more sufficiently meet the needs of the 
Bureau ofReclamation's Central Valley Project, the California Water Project, and 
SMUD. In 1963, while Congress was considering the regional preference bill (S. 
1007), much ofdebate over the fate of the Pacific Intertie revolved around the 
Congressional appropriation of funds to begin construction of any federal lines. It was 
these latter negotiations that would establish the conditions for the fmal round of 
meetings, to be held in 1964, regarding the shape of the Pacific Intertie. If Congress 
were to authorize funding to begin construction of a federally owned intertie, the 
California Power Pool's negotiating leverage dissolved. If, however, Congress denied 
federal planners funds to begin construction, their own leverage considerably 
diminished. 
At the start of 1963, the momentum seemed to favor the public agencies. A 
study group composed of representatives from California's private utilities, the BPA, 
California Water and Power, and Bureau ofReclamation met in Los Angeles to 
examine the costs associated with power sales and electrical transmission between the 
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Northwest and Southwest. The most important outcome of this meeting was the 
increased validity of the federal yardstick. According to Goldhammer: 
The general feeling was that the Task Force Report on costs was high. 
Transmission facilities could be built more economically than indicated 
in~e Task Force Report. I pointed out that the Task Force took the 
higher estimates on the basis that if the lines were feasible under these 
estimates, they would be feasible if the costs were less.93 
If the study group had determined the task force had underestimated the costs 
associated with the construction and operation of the Intertie, the private utilities 
would have new political ammunition to use during appropriation hearings and in their 
public relations efforts. As it was, the overly conservative estimates provided even 
more Justification for the construction of the Pacific Intertie-and more incentive for 
the various parties to bring the vision of the intertie to reality. 
Luce and Udall quickly followed up the January 2 study group meeting with 
another, with officials from PG&E in San Francisco. At that meeting, PG&E was 
told, in no uncertain terms, that their proposal to be the marketing agent for all power 
sent south of the Oregon border was unacceptable to the BP A and the Department of 
the Interior. From PG&E's perspective, regional protection legislation was 
unnecessary if power sold to public agencies in the Southwest could be marketed by a 
private utility, at federal rates, rather than by the BPA. According to Luce, he and 
Udall infonned PG&E: 
Their proposal to purchase power from BP A and resell it to the public 
agencies would not be acceptable. The Secretary's position is that if 
PG&E constructs the Intertie, BP A should sell directly to the ultimate 
93 Bernard Goldhammer to Charles Luce, Conference Report regarding Jan. 2, 1963 .Meeting of the 
Study Group on the PNW intertie with California utilities, held in Los Angeles, Jan. 10, 1963, PNW­
PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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purchaser and PG&E should wheel the power from the Oregon-California 
border to the purchaser. 94 
Bonneville had no desire to enable PG&E to become the sole marketer of federal 
power to customers south of the Oregon stateline. Not only would such a move be 
legally precarious, since courts might still consider the public preference clause of the 
BPA's charter in effect, but the positioning ofthe country's largest private electrical 
utility as the Pacific Intertie's "toll gate operator" and only purchaser of power 
available to the BP A was not viable. 
President Kennedy's January 17 budget message called on Congress to 
appropriate funds to begin construction of the Pacific Intertie and raised the stakes for 
PG&E and the other members of the California Power PooL Kennedy called for: 
Funds to start construction ofmajor extra-high voltage interconnections 
linking the electric systems of the Pacific Northwest and Pacific 
Southwest. The interconnections will provide for sale and exchange of 
power between California and the Northwest, resulting in substantial 
economies to both regions. Prompt action is expected on legislation 
proposed last year to reserve necessary power supplies for the Pacific 
Northwest.95 
If Congress were to appropriate funds for the start of intertie construction, the Power 
Pool would be forced to acquiesce much of their vision for the intertie to the BPA, 
which had already demonstrated a strong desire to build at least one, and maybe two, 
federal lines into the Southwest. 
Even while the negotiating strength ofthe BP A appeared to be gaining a head 
of steam in January, the concerns about the fate ofpublic power purchasers in central 
94 Minutes ofAdministrator's Staff Meetings, Volume 4: 1963 - 1964, Jan. 9, 1963, BPA Library. 
95 A. Lars Nelson, Master of Washington State Grange, to Charles Luce, Jan. 31, 1963, PNW-PSW 
Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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and northern California continued to surface. According to Gus Norwood, 
Executive Secretary ofthe Northwest Public Power Association, for example, even the 
President's budget message was problematic: 
It would appear that the Budget Message does not contemplate 
the inclusion of three important power purchasers or exchangers in 
California: 1) the State itself in connection with the California Water 
Plan, 2) Sacramento Municipal Utility District, and 3) the Central 
Valley Project and its state, federal, public and cooperative customers. 
The obvious remedy to this possible omission would be the 
provision for construction of a Bureau ofRec1amation 500,000 volt 
A.C. line from Trac~ to interconnect with the BPA 500,000 volt line 
near Klamath Falls. 6 
The public agencies in California hoped to bypass the monopoly control of 
PG&E'in the transmission ofenergy from the Northwest by advocating for the 
building of a federally owned portion of the intertie between Tracy, California, and 
Klamath Falls, Oregon. The California Power Pool's January proposal to build two 
500-kv ac interties stretching from Oregon to Los Angels complicated that effort. Not 
only was their proposal the most advanced of any submitted to the BP A, it was also 
well received. Although they wanted better terms before moving forward, the BPA 
was very interested in the Power Pool taking an active role in the construction and 
, operation of at least part of the intertie system. To Goldhammer, it was "highly 
desirable to obtain the full participation of the California Power Pool because these 
utilities serve approximately three-fourths of the load in California.,,97 
The Power Pool's preposal to build two AC legs of the intertie also had the 
effect ofmodifying the plans of the BPA's Task Force for the overall system. If the 
96 Gus Norwood to Charles Luce, Jan. 30, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 

18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

97 Minutes of Administrator's Staff Meetings, Volume 4: 1963 - 1964, Feb. 6, 1963, BPA Library. 
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Power Pool were to build the two A~ legs ofthe intertie, as they proposed, the 
federal government would be able to save an estimated $26,892,000 by routing a third 
DC leg of the intertie through Nevada to Los Angeles, rather than through northern 
and central California. This alternative gained traction with federal planners by mid-
February and led the BPA and Department of Interior to encourage public agencies 
and utilities in California to begin arranging for wheeling contracts with the private 
utilities that would allow them to exchange power with the BP A over Power Pool 
lines.98 
Of course, neither the BP A nor the Power Pool had yet to concede defeat in 
disputes over how energy would be transmitted to California. At a February 19 
meeting with Howard Allen, President of Southern California Edison, and Robert 
Gerdes, Executive Vice President ofPG&E, Luce and Goldhammer reiterated the 
BPA's insistence that the BP A deal directly with any and all customers south of 
Oregon. Gerdes, in tum, argued that the sale of all power to PG&E and the crafting of 
subsequent company contracts to sell the power to third parties "would provide an 
insulation against the preference clause operating to the disadvantage ofNorthwest." 
Gerdes then pointed out that "the Chief Counsel for Los Angeles was satisfied that his 
arrangement was better than the legislation we [BPA] proposed." Luce, in tum, 
replied that he did not believe the contracts would "prevent the preference clause from 
98 Memo from E. J. Harrington, Chief of System Engineering, Bureau ofReclamation, to Eugene White, 
Chief Engineer, regarding Interchange Capacity of375 kv - Pacific Northwest:-Pacific Southwest Tie, 
Feb. 18, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1963 - Mar. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305 NARA Seattle. The 
construction of a federal line from Oregon, through Nevada, into Southern California was attractive 
because the shorter route was less expensive in regard to both construction and right-of-way. Wheeling 
contracts allow for an owner of a transmission line to provide for power to be exchanged between two 
separate parties, while compensating the owner ofthe line for the service. 
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operating, and that the courts would look to the substance and not the fonn of his 
proposed contracts, the substance being the cities of Los Angeles, Sacramento, etc. 
[sic] would be customers ofBonneville.,,99 
According to Luce's assessment of the Feb. 19 meeting with Gerdes and Allen, 
the Power Pool's opposition to the regional preference legislation was "based entirely 
on their fear that with the Bill [establishing regional preference] the political path 
would be cleared for an all federal line or lines.,,100 Luce's commitment to working 
with the companies, even while simultaneously seeking to strengthen his agency's 
negotiating leverage through Congressional approval of the regional preference bill 
and the eannarking of appropriations to begin construction of a federal line, was made 
clear in the same memo, where he concluded: 
I'm convinced that ifwe can settle the transmission line issues in some 
way whereby the companies build the big lines in California, that they 
will concede to the points that the contracts should be directly between 
Bonneville and each of its California customers and will withdraw 
opposition to the legislation. However, no representative of the 
company has actually come out and said th~t such is the case."lOl 
By March, the BPA was moving forward with the assumption that the 
California Power Pool would most likely build and operate the two 500-kv AC legs 
outlined in their fonnal proposal. But, still wanting to see a DC line built, and now 
looking to run it south through Nevada, the BP A began looking for ways to increase 
the economic feasibility of the DC line. Their best option to make that line a reality 
99 Memo from Charles Luce to Assistant Secretary ofWater and Power, regarding Feb. 19, 1963 
Meeting with representatives ofPacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison, Feb. 22, 1963, 
PNW-PSW Intertie, Jan 1963 - Mar. 1963, Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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involved linking the federal hydro systems ofthe Columbia and Colorado River 
systems. Accomplishing this required integrating Hoover Dam directly into the 
Pacific Intertie system, so the BP A began considering two options: 1) establish 
Hoover Dam as the southern terminus of the DC line; or, 2) build a short intertie 
between Hoover Dam and the southern terminal of a DC line stretching from The 
Dalles Dam to Los Angeles. Either way, according to BP A, "The city of Los Angeles 
would need about one-half the capacity of the line, and this would assure its financial 
feasibility."102 
The BPA began pushing for the integration ofHoover Dam into the Pacific 
Intertie system, even though they were well aware ofthe opposition such a move 
would receive from the California Power Pool. In particular, PG&E worried that the 
interconnection of the two river systems "would unload lines that the California 
Power Pool had built to take care ofBPA loads in California." Additionally, Southern 
California Edison feared the line '''would introduce power directly into the systems of a 
number of Southern California Edison's customers.,,103 Federal planners, however, 
, were most interested in maximizing the potential efficiency of future energy 
exchanges between the regions. From the Department of Interior's perspective, there 
was a clear and immediate advantage in connecting the hydroelectrical systems of the 
Columbia and Colorado. Not only could the BPA supplement the Bureau's power 
supply during the period of time required to fill the Glen Canyon Dam's reservoir, 
then being estimated to last between eight and thirty years, but the BP A could also 
102 Minutes ofAdministrator's Staff Meetings, Volume 4: 1963 - 1964, Mar. 25, 1963, BPA Library. 
103 Memo from Luce to Assistant Secretary of Water and Power, Feb. 22, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie, Jan 
1963 - Mar. 1963, Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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provide assistance during water-short years in the future.104 For the BPA, such a 
connection assured yet another customer for their surplus power. And, for the ~ureau, 
the additional energy made available through the Pacific Intertie would allow them to 
fill Glen Canyon much faster than originally planned while also providing more 
stability to their system. 105 
The BPA's steady consideration ofa federal DC line continued to provide their 
intertie planners with a considerable bargaining chip in ongoing negotiations. If the 
Department of Interior was able to gain Congressional authority to build a federally 
owned line, connecting the BPA's grid in the Northwest with the Bureau of 
Reclamation's and the City of Los Angeles' grids in the Southwest, the Power Pool 
would either have to defeat the subsequent efforts to appropriate construction funds, or 
they would have to outmaneuver the federal planners by drawing away potential 
customers in Arizona. The latter option would, in turn, require substantial investments 
by a private utility, most likely Southern California Edison, into both the integration of 
the Southwest's sub-regional electrical grids and the addition of substantial amounts of 
energy to the area's customers. 
Congressional appropriation hearings began in June to consider the 
Department of Interior's request for funds to begin construction of the Pacific Intertie. 
The BPA's budget called for $23 million-$1.5 million for preliminary engineering, 
the rest to begin construction of both the 500-kv AC line between the Columbia River 
104 Earl Ostrander, pirector ofAdministrative Management, BPA, to Charles Luce, Aug. 2, 1963, 
PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1963 - Dec. 1963), Box 18119, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 
lOS The interconnection of the two federal hydrosystems would have also widened the Bureau's options 
in supplying power to customers in both the Colorado River region and the Lower Missouri region 
through the displacement ofpower. 
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and POE's Round Butte Complex and a 750-kv DC line between The Dalles Dam 
and the Oregon-Nevada border. The Bureau ofReclamation, in turn, asked Congress 
for $4 million to begin construction of the southern end of the DC line. 106 Udall 
justified the appropriation by drawing attention to the millions of dollars wasted every 
year on the Columbia system because ofthe lack ofextra-high voltage transmission 
lines reaching south into California and the Southwest. He also stressed the 
importance of constructing a DC line for the "reasons of technological advancement, 
of economy, and ofour Nation's stature in the electrical field.,,107 Importantly, both 
Udall and Luce acknowledged that, while they were asking Congress to write a check 
to begin construction of the Pacific Intertie, negotiations over its final shape and 
ownership were still in process and the agencies' plans could still change. According 
to Udall, 
The reason we request an appropriation is that we are in the process of 
negotiation. Some of these people will say to us, "We will build the 
line and we will provide transmission on very favorable terms." But 
whether we ultimately get terms that are favorable enough will depend 
upon whether we have the alternative to construct a federal line. If we 
don't have that alternative, we feel that we are not going to get 
favorable terms. 108 
As expected, representatives from the California Power Pool testified against 
the federal appropriations by reiterating the same arguments they had voiced since the 
beginning. They considered the construction of any federal lines south of Oregon 
106 Norwood, ~'Administrative Challenge and Response," 65 - 66. 
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unnecessary. 1.K. Horton, president of Southern California Edison, testified on 
behalf ofhis company and typified the Power Pool's response: 
We oppose expenditure of federal taxpayers' money for any Federal 
Government line, direct current or alternating current, within the State 
of California because investor-owned companies are ready, willing and 
able to provide ade~uate transmission service in California at no cost to 
federal taxpayers. 10 
In regard to the proposed DC leg, Horton also pointed out that his company had 
recently solidified plans to construct a 500-kv AC line between Southern California 
and Arizona. 
The existence of this Arizona-California extra-high-voltage 
interconnection further eliminates need or even desirability for a federal 
direct current line through Nevada to Southern California, which relies 
upon a power market in Arizona and Nevada for its justification ...We 
believe these power markets listed are not firm, realistic or reliable 
market projections and should not be used to justify the direct current 
line....The investor-owned companies in California do not intend to 
purchase any power over this single federal direct current line nor do 
they intend to provide stand-by reserve to support this federal direct 
current line to compete unfairly and sell power at unrealistic, federal­
taxpayer-subsidized rates. 110 
PG&E's Gerdes similarly rejected the need for any federal intertie and echoed 
Horton's claim that the Power Pool was not willing to interconnect their systems with 
the proposed DC leg because of its technological inadequacies and a basic 
incompatibility with standard AC transmission systems. The companies were afraid 
of exposing their systems to potential blackouts stemming from outages on the DC 
line. To compensate for the removal of the DC line from the plans for the Pacific 
109 Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee on Interior Power Marketing Agencies 
on Proposed Pacific Northwest-California Power Intertie, June 12 1963, by 1. K. Horton, President of 
Southern California Edison Company, PNW-PSW Intertie, (Apr. 1963 -June 1963), Box 18119, RG 
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Intertie, he pointed out that the companies had recently increased the planned 
capacity of their two AC lines (from a combined 1,500 mw to 2,000 mw).ll1 Gerdes 
also made clear his belief that, ifCongress were to approve the appropriation requests 
and pass the regional preference bill, Luce would "put a loaded gun at the utilities' 
heads so that he can dictate, not negotiate, terms that are acceptable to him.,,112 
The shrewd negotiating tactics of the federal planners, combined with the 
fluidity of their intertie plans, earned a raised brow from Senator Carl Hayden (D-AZ). 
Chairman of both the Senate Appropriations Committee and Public Works 
Subcommittee, he called upon Udall to clarify his testimony made during the summer 
hearings. In particular, Hayden wanted Udall to provide him with more background 
on what he meant in the hearings when he asked the committee to, 
Consider what happened only last weekend. This California Power 
Pool-and they are tough, able negotiators-came up with an 
additional term that was highly favorable to us. This makes their offer 
much more attractive. We believe there is still some further ground to 
be gained. We are not completely satisfied with the offers as they stand 
at the present time, and it is our past experience in that we cannot get 
down to cases until we have the appropriations from Congress so that 
we can say, "Congress has given us some money. We are going to go 
ahead unless you offer us terms that are acceptable." 113 
Udall responded: 
III During the 1963 appropriation struggle, the benefits and pitfalls ofthe commercial use of high 
voltage DC transmission were highly contested. Proponents relied heavily on testimony and subsequent 
written comments by Dr. Uno Lamm, Director ofthe Swedish ASEA, and inventor of many 
technologies that allowed for the application of extra-high voltage DC transmission to commercial 
operations. The California Power Pool relied on testimony from EBASCO, an engineering fInn based 
in New York, which warned against prematurely integrating the technology into American AC 
electrical systems. 
112 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 69. 
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The point I was trying to make was that if we were unable to work out an 
agreement with the power companies, we would proceed with the D.C. 
line, which would result in a feasible operating system without reliance 
on arrangements with the power companies. Under such a 
circumstance we would not construct the section of the 500-kv A.C. 
line north of California... it is our intention to construct the D.C. line 
unless a satisfactory alternate proposal is received. 114 
By the summer of 1963, the strategy of the federal planners ~o gain leverage in 
the ongoing intertie negotiations came as no surprise to members of the Power Pool. 
Similarly, much of the testimony by members of the California Power Pool was 
already familiar to federal planners, and the formal submission of their arguments did 
little to change the momentum ofnegotiations. What did seem to come as a surprise 
was a June 24 announcement by Samuel B. Nelson, General Manager and Chief 
Engineer for Los Angeles Water and Power, that Los Angeles favored the proposal of 
the California Power Pool to supply the city with power over their two AC lines, in 
lieu of a federal DC line routed through Nevada. I IS 
Once Los Angeles indicated a preference for an arrangement with the Power 
Pool, the economic feasibility of the Nevada routing of a federal DC intertie was put 
into enough doubt that federal planners changed their routing plans once again. 
Subsequently, the Intertie Task Force renewed its original plans to build a federal DC 
line that stretched southward through California, with a tap at Tracy to supply the 
Bureau's Central Valley Project, the California Water Plan, and SMUD's power 
114 Udall to Hayden, Sept. 4, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1963 -Dec. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, 
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needs, before terminating at Sylmar, near Los Angeles.116 In an October 25 letter of 
support for the revised federal line, R. J. McMullin, General Manager ofArizona's 
Salt River Project, explained to Senator Hayden: 
The load growth ofpublic agencies in the Colorado River Basin and in 
the Northern California area is sufficient to provide a market for all 
foreseeable sources ofhydro-electric power and energy. It is to be 
noted that the loads do not take into account the requirements of the 
City of Los Angeles, the municipalities in the vicinity of the City of 
Los Angeles, or the Metropolitan Water District. I 17 
By the end of October, Secretary Udall, while acknowledging that he would 
continue to rely on help from "the Bureau and Bonneville people," asserted his 
authority over the ongoing Congressional negotiations by recommending to Assistant 
Secretary Holum, that "at this stage all policy matters should be determined by the 
Secretary.,,118 Additionally, Udall reiterated his conviction that the intertie planners 
working under him not wed the Department of Interior to any specific routes for the 
Pacific Intertie while negotiations were still underway. Beyond that, he suggested that 
they "should make it clear that the major purpose ofconstruction of the lines is to 
interconnect the Federal power systems from the Pacific Southwest to the Columbia 
River.,,1l9 
116 Draft letter from Stewart Udall to House Appropriations Committee, Oct. 17, 1963, PNW-PSW 
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On November S, in order to bring Hayden and the Senate Appropriations 
Committee up to date, both Udall and Luce provided testimony describing the four 
leading op~ions then under consideration by the federal intertie planners. 120 
Importantly, all four of the options presented to Congress were limited to two lines 
each, a result of the fact that Canadian power (from the yet-to-be ratified Columbia 
River Treaty) was still unavailable for formal consideration by intertie planners. 
These four options included: 
1. 	 Two SOO-kv ac lines stretching from the Columbia River to Los Angeles, 
with the Oregon portion built by the BP A and the California portion built 
by the Power Pool; 
2. 	 One SOO-kv ac line running from the Columbia to Los Angeles, built by the 
BPA and the Power Pool, plus a 1000-kv dc line built by International 
Utilities stretching from the Columbia to Los Angeles via Nevada; 
3. 	 One SOO-kv ac line running from the Columbia to Los Angeles, built by the 
BP A and the Power Pool, plus a 1000-kv dc line built by the BP A and 
International Utilities stretching from the Columbia to Los Angeles via 
Nevada; and 
4. 	 One 500-kv ac line running from the Columbia to Los Angeles, built by the 
BP A and the Power Pool, plus a federal 800-kv dc line running from the 
Columbia through Tracy to Los Angeles. 121 
Over the next month, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
approved their versions of the 1964 Public Works Appropriations Bill. By then, half 
of the fiscal year had already passed, so the funds allotted to both the BP A and the 
Bureau of Reclamation were each below the levels originally requested. Specifically, 
Congress had allotted $6.S million for the BPA ($I.S million for planning and 
development; $S million to begin acquiring land and equipment), and $2 million for 
120 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 71. 
121 Ibid 
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the Bureau (to begin acquiring land and equipment) in their efforts to begin building 
the Pacific Intertie. I22 
The House passed its version first, on November 15, with a condition that 
construction could not proceed until a regional preference bill was passed by 
Congress. The bill also specified that "at least one [of the two lines] shall connect 
with the California Power Pool System at the northern California border and be 
terminated at that point." Furthermore, the House Appropriations Committee 
stipulated: 
Construction shall not begin unless the Secretary of the Interior fmds, 
after good faith negotiations with utilities and other entities interested 
in constructing any portion of the lines involved, that their proposals 
will not result in benefits to the national interest at least equal to those 
to be derived from Federal construction, including revenues which will 
accrue to the Federal Government after amortization of the line or lines; 
has submitted his findings to the committee; and the committee has 
hand an opportunity to review them. 123 
For Udall,:the appropriation levels were adequate, since roughly $20 million of 
the BPA's requested $21.5 million was intended for the advance purchase of DC 
equipment and halfof the fiscal year had passed already. However, the House's 
requirement that at least one of the federally constructed lines connect the Power 
Pool's lines to the BPA's system at the Oregon-California state line seemed ill-
conceived. In a November 29 letter to Senator Hayden, who was then in the process 
of working on the Senate's version of the bill, Udall warned: 
122 Ibid, 72. Note: Norwood's discussion ofthe budget allotment fails to mention the $1.5 million for 
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The stipulation .. .imposes a restriction that is not necessarily in the best 
interests of the Federal Government. Based upon negotiations that 
have proceeded so far, there is no final assurance that a satisfactory 
arrangement can be made with the California Power Pool System, in 
which case no construction ofthe second line would be 
undertaken....The ability of the Department to effectuate such an 
overall relationship would be enhanced by the elimination of the above­
quoted stipulation.124 
Since the federal intertie planners were already fully engaged in negotiations 
with all of the parties that had shown interest in building portions of the intertie, the 
requirement for "good-faith negotiations" did not prove to be onerous. Rather, it 
likely helped infuse the process with a renewed sense of fairness, even while each of 
the parties continued their efforts to leverage negotiations in their favor. As a matter 
of fact, while the negotiations continued to play out, both Luce and Udall would 
increasingly reference this order when facing criticisms that the intertie plans were 
moving forward to the disadvantage of public agencies-or conversely, to the 
advantage ofthe Power Pool companies. 
On December 5, the Senate Appropriations Committee passed its version of 
the 1964 Public Works Appropriations Bill, authorizing the appropriation of $8.5 
million to begin work on the Pacific Intertie. Importantly, the Senate Appropriations 
Committee agreed with Udall's assessment and struck the requirement to interconnect 
the BPA's grid to the Power Pool's (while still allowing for it). In fact, the Senate 
actually provided the federal planners with a considerable improvement in the 
legislation's language. Specifically, they added one sentence of significance. 
124 Udall to Hayden, Nov. 29, 1963, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 1963 - Dec. 1963), Box 18119, RG 305, 
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If it is determined that only one line shall be constructed at this time it shall 
be a direct current line to accomplish the interconnection of the 
Bonneville system, the Central Valley ofCalifornia, and the Hoover 
Dam powerplant, the sale and exchange of Bonneville surplus power 
and energy and the sale and exchange of surplus power and energy 
between these areas. 125 
Congressional passage of the 1964 Public Works Appropriations Bill on 
December 31, 1963, provided federal planners with a much-advantaged position for 
the final round ofnegotiations over the shape of the Pacific Intertie. Congress had 
given the federal planners an order to carry out those negotiations in "good faith" with 
the other parties involved, but if the federal planners could prove to Congress that they 
were not offered proposals "at least equal to those derived from Federal construction," 
they were well positioned to move forward with their own plans, without any formal 
requirement to link the Power Pool's grid to their own. With Luce and Udall already 
focusing the rhetoric of the federal effort around the concept of linking together the 
three federal power systems of the Columbia River, Central Valley Project, and 
Colorado River, the possibility certainly existed for the exclusion, or at least severely 
diminished role, of the Power Pool companies in the exchange of electrical power 
between the Northwest and Southwest. Subsequently, Congress had established a very 
strong incentive for the California Power Pool to accede to many of the terms 
forwarded by the federal negotiating team. 
125 1964 Public Works Appropriation Bill, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, S. Rep. 746,40. 
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CHAPTER 6: The Columbia River Treaty and the Canadian Entitlement 
On January 17, 1961, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Canadian 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker signed the Columbia River Treaty, marking the 
culmination of more than fifteen years of international study and negotiation over the 
cooperative development of the Columbia River system. Two months later, the U.S. 
Congress ratified the treaty; however, conflicts between British Columbia and Canada 
would delay Canadian ratification until 1964.126 In the interim between the American 
and Canadian ratifications of the treaty, the BP A's efforts to build the Pacific Intertie 
became interwoven with the fate of the treaty. 
Efforts to craft a formal plan for the coordinated international management of 
the Columbia River system date back to 1944, when the United States-Canada 
International Joint Commission began the task of formally studying the feasibility of 
. collaboratively developing the upper Columbia River Basin.127 While the American 
portion of the Columbia River Basin was already being extensively developed with 
hydropower projects by the early 1960s, the majority ofthe existing and planned dams 
on the Columbia's mainstem were designed without much, if any, storage capacity. 
For example, federally built run-of-the-river dams like Bonneville, The Dalles, and 
McNary on the mid-Columbia, and mainstem dams built by public utilities in 
Washington (Priest Rapids, Wanapum, Rocky Reach, Rock Island, and Wells) were 
designed without any storage capability. In fact, the aggregate storage offered by all 
126 Springer, Power and the Pacific Northwest, 66 - 67. 
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of the Columbia Basin's mainstem and tributary dams (that fed into the Columbia 
upriver of the hydropower projects) amounted to approximately 21 million acre-feet, 
and Grand Coulee Dam accounted for almost a quarter of that volume. 128 The 
Columbia River Treaty provided Americans with an opportunity to nearly double the 
storage capacity of the river's collective hydropower system by impounding an 
additional 20 million acre-feet ofwater behind four proposed headwater dams. 129 The 
increased storage, in turn, promised an opportunity for all downstream American 
hydropower projects to increase generating capacity through the incorporation of 
additional (and/or more efficient) generating linits at each dam. 
The Columbia River Treaty- called for the construction of three large storage 
dams in British Columbia, and it allowed for the construction of Libby Dam, with 
5,000,000 acre-feet of storage, on the Kootenai River in Montana (with a reservoir that 
backed up forty-two miles into Canada).130 According to Article II of the treaty, 
"Canada shall provide in the Columbia River basin in Canada 15,500,000 acre-feet of 
storage usable for improving the flow of the Columbia River." Their approximate 
locations were specified: 
a) 	 On the Columbia River near Mica Creek, British Columbia, with 
approximately 7,000,000 acre-feet of storage; 
128 Willingham, Army Engineers and the Development 0/Oregon, 158. When completed in 1968, the 
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b) 	Near the outlet of Arrow Lakes, British Columbia, with approximately 
7,100,000 acre-feet of storage; and 
c) 	 On one or more tributaries of the Kootenay River in British 
Columbia downstream from the Canada-United States ofAmerican 
boundary with storage equivalent in effect to approximately 
1,400,000 acre-feet of storage near Duncan Lake, British 
Columbia.131 
Each of Canada's three dams was assigned specific flood control storage plans, for 
which the United States agreed to pay a combined $64,400,000.132 The treaty also 
dictated the timetable for the completion of each dam and penalties for delay. Once 
the treaty was fully ratified, Canada-or, more specifically, British Columbia-was 
obligated to complete the Arrow Lakes Dam and Duncan Dam within five years and 
Mica Dam within nine years. 133 
As ~ompensation and incentive for constructing the dams in Canada, the treaty 
stipUlated the sharing of all downstream power benefits equally between the two 
countries. 134 According to Article VII(l), "The downstream power benefits shall be 
the difference in the hydroelectric power capable of being generated in the United 
States of American with and ,without the use of Canadian storage, detennined in 
advance.,,135 While the treaty did allow for the possibility of the United States and 
Canada to fonnally negotiate for the disposal of "portions of the downstream power 
benefits" in the United States, in the absence of such agreement, the treaty clearly 
131 Columbia River Treaty Documents, The Columbia Treaty, Article II, 3. 
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called for the downstream' power benefits to be delivered to Canada as "dependable 
hydroelectric capacity" and "usable hydroelectric energy.,,136 
In order to provide half of the downstream power benefits to Canada (also 
referred to as the "Canadian entitlement"), the treaty directed the United States to 
"deliver to Canada at a point on the Canada-United States ofAmerica boundary near 
Oliver, British Columbia, or at such other place as the entities may agree upon," the 
power owed to Canada.137 The delivery of the Canadian entitlement generated within 
the United States required the construction ofextra-high voltage transmission lines 
and terminals to transmit power to Oliver and then westward to Vancouver, British 
Columbia. To cover the subsequent costs accrued to the United States, the treaty 
required Canada to pay "$1.50 United States dollars a year for each kilowatt of 
dependable hydroelectric capacity included" in the Canadian entitlement. And, in 
order to "improve system stability of the east-west circuits in British Columbia," the 
treaty directed the United States to provide east-west standby transmission service 
adequate to safeguard the transmission" between Oliver and Vancouver. 138 
136 Ibid., Article VII, 6. 
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British Columbia's government, under the leadership ofPremier William 
Andrew Cecil (typically referred to as W. A. C.) Bennett, ultimately refused to accede 
to the treaty's instruction that the Canadian entitlement be delivered by the BPA for 
sale in Canada. The root of Bennett's intransigence grew from his desire to 
industrially develop the Peace River Basin in northeastern British Columbia. The 
introduction of Columbia River power into the province threatened the centerpiece of 
Bennett's vision for the Peace River Basin, because it relied on the development of the 
Peace's hydropower potential. The only way Bennett was going to commit British 
Columbia to the ratification of the treaty, was if a solution could be found that allowed 
for the parallel development ofboth the Peace and Columbia rivers. This "two-river 
policy" position was made well known during the treaty negotiations, but the 
Canadian government mistakenly discounted Bennett's commitment to developing the 
Peace as mere posturing.139 During the ensuing stalemate in Canada over the 
ratification of the treaty, Bennett clearly stated his insistence on developing the Peace 
River system to Robert Jameison of Montreal's Financial Times. 
The Peace is going ahead. It's a matter ofhigh policy. We're going to 
develop that country, and there's nothing much to be gained in price­
ifanything-by building the Columbia ...The country's ripe for 
opening up. It's got gas, oil, minerals and some of our best timberland. 
We've pushed roads and the railway in and I believe we'll see a new 
industrial empire up there, electro-chemical plants, petro-chemicals, 
primary reduction of ores are some possibilities. This isn't just a pipe 
dream. 140 
139 Northwest Power and Conservation Council, "Columbia River Treaty: Design and Purposes," 
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Even without the delivery of the Canadian entitlement to British Columbia, there 
was barely enough of an electrical market to cover the investment in the Peace River 
project. If Columbia River power was delivered into British Columbia as envisioned 
by the treaty, the Peace River project would suffer from the ensuing glut ofpower and 
become economically unfeasible for decades. 
The most viable solution, as Bennett saw it, was for both rivers to be 
developed simultaneously. Accordingly, he believed that "ifboth are to go ahead at 
the same time, we just have to export some of the power, and obviously the first power 
to be sold in the United States is the power from our downstream benefits which is 
generated there.,,141 Beyond benefiting the Peace River development effort, the sale of 
the Canadian entitlement in the U.S. power market had the potential to provide British 
Columbia with the revenue needed to build its three treaty-stipulated dams as well. 
And, if the power remained in the United States, both countries could avoid the costly 
development of the transmission systems required to deliver power from the Columbia 
system into Canada and subsequent east-west connections to provide power and 
standby service between Oliver and Vancouver. 
As early as the spring of 1961, officials representing the government ofBritish 
Columbia communicated their belief to the BP A that Canadian ratification of the 
treaty would likely rely on the sale oftheir share of downstream benefits in the United 
States.142 Of course, with the American half of the downstream benefits already 
needing to be absorbed in the Pacific Northwest, the likelihood of immediately 
141 Ibid. 
142 Bernard Goldhammer to Charles Kinney, Assistant Administrator to Ivan White, Dec. 12, 1962, Last 
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consuming the Canadian entitlement as well was a non-starter. If British Columbia 
was going to sell the Canadian entitlement in the United States, it was going to have to 
be purchased by utilities in the Southwest. 
Luckily, by that time, Luce and the intertie task force had already begun their 
efforts to craft the regional preference legislation needed to clear the way for the 
construction of the Pacific Intertie system. The timing for the conceptual inclusion of 
Canadian power into intertie planning was ideal, and the BP A was well positioned to 
probe California's power market for potential customers at the same time that they 
distributed the first drafts of the regional protective legislation for comment. Beyond 
the practicality of beginning the process of determining the fair market value of the 
Canadian entitlement in the U.S. market, the introduction of the concept likely helped 
raise interest in the Pacific Intertie itself. Because the California market was 
especially hungry for firm power, the potential availability ofCanadian power 
provided Californians much more incentive to support the passage of a regional 
preference bill and construction of the Northwest-Southwest intertie system than the 
availability of the BP A's secondary power alone. 
Although British Columbia was not prepared to offer a solid price for the sale 
of the Canadian entitlement in the United States, they were able to provide "rough 
estimates" to the BP A by July so that agency could "survey potential markets" in 
California. Those estimates for "peaking capacity and energy on a firm basis" ranged 
from a low of $12 per kw-year and 3 mills per kilowatt-hour to a high of $15 per kw­
year and 4 mills per year, and the BPA included them in a questionnaire sent 
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throughout California, which sought, in part to determine how much Canadian 
power utilities would buy at various prices offered.143 The interest was there, but with 
the exception of Cali fomi a's Department of Water Resources, the asking price was too 
high for the state's biggest customers. 144 L.A.'s Department of Water and Power, for 
example, replied that they would only be willing to pay "$14.00 per kilowatt per year 
and 2.5 mills per kilowatt-hour at Los Angeles," a price that included transmission 
costs and line losses. 145 The California Power Pool, on the other hand, declined to 
answer the questionnaire with "specific numbers" and felt that any discussion over 
Canadian power was "distinctly speculative," but stated: 
The rate reportedly asked by British Columbia for prospective Treaty 
power substantially exceeds the current incremental fuel cost of 
producing the energy from existing and proposed thermal stations in 
Southern California. Also there is a possibility that competition from 
future nuclear power may result in pricing Canada's asking price for 
power out of the market. 146 
The BPA reported the general findings to B.C. officials at an October 1961 meeting in 
Portland. If the Canadians were committed to selling their power in California, it was 
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clear from the responses submitted to the BPA in 1961 that the B.C. government 
would have to be flexible on the price. 147 
By the end of 1961, it had become obvious to American observers that much of 
Canada's ratification fight was being waged over the fate of the Canadian entitlement. 
On November 29, the U.S. State Department, Department of the Interior, and BPA 
issued a joint statement to the media and all their employees: 
The United States would be satisfied to see any, all, or none of the 
Canadian share of the power sold in the United States as Canada may 
freely decide. The basic decision on the issue of disposition of its 
power is obviously Canada's alone and has always been so regarded by 
the United States Government. 148 
With the Canadian stalemate continuing into 1962, Luce found it necessary to remind 
his staff in March "to limit any comment on the Canadian Treaty to the framework" of 
the statement issued in November. 
Treaty negotiations in Canada did not begin progressing beyond the stalemate 
until the late summer of 1962, when the Canadian government finally started to 
formally explore British Columbia's position that the entitlement should be sold in the 
United States. 149 By then, Bennett's plans to build a hydropower project on the Peace 
River had begun to solidify sufficiently that the Canadian government could see that 
147 Bernard Goldhammer to Charles Kinney, Assistant Administrator to Ivan White, Dec. 12, 1962, Last 
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his stubborn insistence on building up the Peace River system was more than a bluff 
designed to increase the size the of the Canadian entitlement. Evidence of Bennett's 
plans was writ large. At a special session of the provincial Legislature, convened in 
August 1961 at Bennett's request, the premier introduced the Power Development Act, 
which officially expropriated the privately owned B.C. Electric Company and directed 
it to absorb the Peace River Power Development Company. The Legislature, after 
heated debate, passed the act unanimously.ISO By the end of the year, the province 
was well positioned to accelerate the development of the Peace River Basin. lSI 
Plans for the construction of the Portage Mountain Dam (later renamed the 
W.A.C. Bennett Dam), one of the first two dams proposed for the Peace River, had 
proceeded by the summer of 1962 to the point where the B.C. Hydro and Power 
Authority began to coordinate their efforts with the BPA in order to move Bennett's 
2
"two-river policy" forward in the most efficient manner possible.1s While "the 
outputs and rates of installation" were still "flexible" and could vary "to suit the 
markets for the power and to take into account different rates of filling the reservoir 
150 Swainson, Conflict Over the Columbia, 201 203; Elliott, The Sociology ofNatural Resources, 170. 
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during the first few years," it had become obvious to Canadian observers, at least, 
that British Columbia was going to develop the Peace River. 153 
Representatives from the U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams began sitting 
down together in an attempt to work out the details of how to sell the Canadian 
entitlement in the U.S. power market at a three-day meeting held in Washington, D.C. 
on September 11, 12, and 13. At that meeting, the Canadian negotiating team, led by 
Hugh L. Keenleyside, Chairman of B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, submitted a 
formal proposal for consideration by the United States. The proposal contained five 
basic points: 
1. 	 There should be a contract to sell to the BP A Canada's entitlement to 
the downstream benefits resulting from the Columbia projects 
envisaged in the Treaty. 
2. 	 The contract should be between the BPA and the B~C. Hydro and 
Power Authority, which has been designated as the Canadian entity. 
3. 	 The contract should be for the life of the Treaty provided that if 
Canada's requirements for power necessitate such action Canada may, 
after a period of 10 years and on 10 years' notice, reduce the amount of 
power sold under this agreement. 
4. 	 Canada will sell the Canadian entitlement ofenergy to the United 
States at 5 mills and, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, it is 
understood that capacity will· be exchanged for energy, this energy also 
to be paid for at 5 mills on the basis of an agreed formula. 
5. 	 Bonneville, or some other United States Government agency, will make 
money available for the construction of the Columbia projects, this 
money to be provided at the interest rate that is charged by the United 
States when supplying funds for hydro projects in the United States.154 
IS3 Ibid. 
IS4 Agreed Summary of Supplementary U.S. Comments on Certain British Columbia Proposal, Oct. 2, 
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Returning to the table again on October 2 for a two-day meeting in Portland, 
the U.S. representatives responded to the Canadians' September proposal rather 
coldly. The Americans were open to the idea ofhaving the Canadian entitlement sold 
in the U.S. market, but they saw the BPA as a third-party involved in the transactions 
rather than a viable purchaser of that power. While they were willing to speed up the 
payment of the flood control benefits in order to help finance the construction of 
Canadian storage projects, they did not foresee Congress subsidizing the public works 
of a wealthy industrialized nation. In regard to the contemplated price being floated 
by the Canadians for the sale of their entitlement in the U.S. market, American 
negotiators concluded: 
It was not believed that the United States could pay more for the 
Canadian entitlement than the United States market would justify on 
the basis of the cost of alternate sources ofpower...a cost substantially 
less than a five mill rate for the Canadian entitlement at a 60% load 
factor. 
Additionally, the U.S. representatives thought that the purchase 
of the Canadian entitlement at a price above the United States market 
would in effect amount to a derogation of the principle of the equal 
sharing of benefits upon which the Tre'aty was negotiated. 155 
Furthermore, the U.S. team believed that both parties to the treaty should be granted 
identical privileges to terminate the contracts stemming from the sale of the 
entitlement in the United States. 
In addition to almost wholly rejecting the Canadians' proposal, the U.S. 
negotiators then suggested four alternatives of their own. First, they suggested that the 
Canadians simply ratify the treaty without any further delay. Specifically, this would 
ISS Ibid. 
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have meant the disposal of the Canadian entitlement directly to British Columbia in 
the form of electricity, with the possibility for surplus power to be marketed in the 
U.S. market if desired. Americans were happy with the terms of the treaty already. 
"If the agreed approach [of 1961] is to be discarded, it is important to understand that 
it is a Canadian decision based upon domestic Canadian considerations, and that it is 
not a decision in which the United States government participated.,,156 
Second, if the Canadians agreed to move forward with the ratification of the . 
treaty, the U.S. team proposed that a block ofpower drawn from the Canadian 
entitlement should be sold in the United States. In regard to the sale of the 
entitlement, the U.S. believed the Canadians could obtain a better price if they agreed 
to sell the power under long-term contracts. For example, contracts drawn up for 
periods ofat least thirty years would raise the value of the block ofpower because it 
would match the standard lifespan of a thermal plant. The revenue generated from the 
sale ofthe block ofpower could then be applied to the costs of dam construction in 
British Columbia. 157 
The third and fourth alternatives both concerned the timing ofBritish 
Columbia's treaty-based commitment to build Mica Dam. If the Canadians were to 
agree to the first two points, then the U.S. team saw an opportunity for British 
Columbia to pay for the construction ofMica Dam by installing generating capacity 
immediately on construction, marketing the subsequent power generated in the United 
States. Alternatively, if the Canadians deemed it to be more advantageous to delay the 
156 Statement by U.S. Representatives at Meeting, Oct. 2, 1962, Canadian Storage--Current Studies 
1962, Box 25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 
157 Ibid 
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completion of Mica Dam even longer than the nine years contemplated by the 
treaty, the U.S. team was willing to modify the treaty to expand the allowable schedule 
to seventeen years. 158 
The international face-off over the fate of the Canadian entitlement picked up 
where it left off when talks resumed in Vancouver, B.C., on December 19, 1962. This 
time, the U.S. team delivered a formal proposal to the Canadians. As described by 
Ivan B. White, Chairman of the U.S. negotiating team, the proposal was "really a stool 
resting on six legs": 
1. 	 An Exim Bank credit for five years equivalent to the flood control 
benefits for the first two dams at not to exceed 4.5% interest. 
2. 	 Federal appropriations to build transmission lines to California to 
carry a portion of the Canadian entitlement to markets, to be 
constructed on a Federal interest basis. 
3. 	 The long-term purchase at 3.75 mills United States or 4 mills 
Canadian of the Canadian entitlement by public entities in the 
United States-the quantity to be maintained constant for thirty 
years. 
4. 	 Public entities on the main stem of the Columbia to finance the 
balance of the costs of the first two dams, Arrow and Duncan, 
through the advanc~ purchase of 26% of the entitlement. 
5. 	 The Dominion and British Columbia governments to take the 
financial responsibility for that part of the cost of Mica storage and 
Mica generation and transmission required additional to the cash 
flow from balance in the United States of the remaining 74% of the 
entitlement. 
6. 	 The Dominion and British Columbia governments to have the 
responsibility for making marketing decisions regarding Mica 
generation power and to decide whether construction ofMica is to 
proceed according to the Treaty or, alternatively, whether these 
governments desire to discuss with the United States government 
rescheduling arrangements for Mica construction.,,159 
158 Ibid 
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The Canadian team, which, according to U.S. Consul General Hayden Raynor, 
"regarded this meeting as one which would have a 'seriously influencing effecf upon 
the future course of the B.C. Government," walked away from the meeting without 
achieving any of their agenda. 160 With Bennett standing firm in his insistence of 
receiving five mills per kilowatt-hour of the Canadian entitlement and the Americans 
unwilling to commit to a price that the domestic market would not support, 
negotiations were at an impasse. To spur the British Columbia government toward a 
reasonable compromise, the U.S. negotiating team made it clear that the Canadian 
delays had renewed interest in viable alternative plans to achieve flood control and 
storage without Canada's help. Additionally, the U.S. government was continuing to 
move forward with power projects, most being hydropower, already planned and 
authorized in the Columbia River Basin. 161 According to the U.S. proposal to the 
Canadians, "If alternative power and storage projects should proceed prior to 
Canadian ratification of the Treaty, the benefits from the Canadian storage would be 
substantially reduced and it would be necessary to modify the Treaty accordingly." 
According to White, it was entirely possible that the "apparent stalemate 
pointed to the inevitable conclusion that the Treaty signed ...would fail.,,162 Still, the 
160 Confidential Memo from Hayden Raynor to Charles Luce, Dec. 21, 1962, Last Half 1962, 

McIntyre-Canadian Storage, Box 25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 

161 Other power projects mentioned by the U.S. negotiating team included: Bruces Eddy (Clearwater 

River in Idaho), Knowles-Paradise (near confluence of the Flathead and Clark Fork Rivers in Montana), 

Nez Perce or Big Mountain Sheep (on the Snake in Idaho-Oregon), Lower Monumental, Little Goose, 

Lower Granite, Asotin, and China Gardens dams (on the Snake River), Wells Dam (on the Columbia), 

Boundary Dam on the Pend Oreille, and the Hanford and Cle Elum thermal-e1ectric plants." See 

Proposal ofU.S. Representatives Relative to Implementation ofthe Columbia River Treaty, Dec. 19, 

1962, Last Half 1962, McIntyre-Canadian Storage, Box 25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 

162 Statement of Ivan B. White, Dec. 19, 1962, Last Half 1962, McIntyre-Canadian Storage, Box 

25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 

81 
potential benefits to both nations arising from the successful ratification of the 
treaty deserved "one final try," particularly since "the collapse of this treaty would be 
a confession of failure by both countries" and "a defeat for the free world.,,163 
Matters remained substantively unchanged until the summer of 1963, when the 
British Columbia and Ottawa governments finally worked out their differences over 
the fate of the downstream benefits. The thawing of relations between the provincial 
and Dominion governments began with the April election of Lester B. Pearson as 
Prime Minister and his appointment of Paul Martin (an ex-colleague of Keenleyside) 
as Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Pearson administration pursued 
ratification through the drafting of a protocol to aid in the clarification of certain 
provisions of the treaty, rather than pushing for a complete renegotiation of the treaty 
itself. Toward that end, Martin moved to reconcile matters with British Columbia by 
working with them to negotiate the terms for a draft protocol to be submitted first to 
Parliament and then to the U.S. negotiating team. 164 
On May 10 and 11, Prime Minister Pearson met with President Kennedy at 
Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, in an effort to improve U.S.-Canadian relations. 165 As 
part of the low-key agenda, Pearson relayed his government's chosen approach toward 
the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty, and he predicted that the domestic 
reconciliation between the B.C. and Ottawa governments and the ensuing 
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Parliamentary review might take several months to accomplish.166 As it turned out, 
matters proceeded fairly smoothly. The meetings with B.C. officials commenced on 
June 3 and 4, with an agreement finalized and signed on July 8 and sent to Parliament 
for review. 167 A draft protocol was then produced by Parliament on July 18 and 
reviewed by B.C. before meetings were scheduled with the United States.168 
The B.C.-Ottawa agreement settled most outstanding matters of domestic 
conflict over the treaty_ Most importantly, British Columbia had prevailed in its 
struggle to sell the Canadian entitlement in the United States. It would, in turn, use the 
money raised from the sale of its downstream benefits, along with the flood control 
payments, to pay for the cost ofbuilding the treaty-stipulated dams. British Columbia 
Hydro and Power Authority would also become the Canadian entity responsible for 
carrying out the technical terms of the treaty. The Dominion government committed 
its resources toward the negotiation of the protocol with the United States and would 
proceed "with due diligence" toward the ratification of the treaty. 169 
International negotiations over the Columbia River Treaty resumed on August 
1 and 2 in Ottawa and were followed in Washington on September 6. At the latter 
meeting, the Canadian team responded to the U.S. proposal submitted in December 
1962 with five points: 
1. 	 It was undesirable and impractical for a Canadian entity to act as its 
own salesman in the United States; 
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2. 	 There was no assurance there would be a market for all the Canadian 
entitlement or that the price was a firm one (except for a small 
proportion of the entitlement); 
3. 	 Canada could not afford to sell at the price offered; 
4. 	 The suggested methods offinancing, while going some distance 
toward what Canada had in mind, did not go far enough; 
5. 	 On the other aspects of the United States proposal agreement could 
probably be reached. 170 
In response, the U.S. team, which included members ofprivate power 
companies and Northwestern public utility districts for the first time, pointed out that 
they still didn't consider the BPA to be a feasible purchaser of the Canadian 
entitlement. Setting up Bonneville as the buyer would be "unprecedented and would 
require appropriations which we [Department of Interior] would not want to seek and 
probably would not get."l71 The U.S. team suggested a more viable alternative might 
be the creation of a U.S. entity with the sole purpose ofbuying and selling the 
Canadian entitlement. 172 
Regarding the price of the power, the U.S. negotiators reminded the Canadians 
that the BPA's customers already had ready access to power at less than 3.2 mills per 
kilowatt hour and were subsequently "not interested in higher priced power.,,173 If 
customers for the Canadian entitlement were to be found, they would have to be found 
in the California market, where energy costs were higher than in the U.S. Northwest. 
They also informed the Canadians that Congress was currently working out 
appropriations to begin construction of the Pacific Intertie, and so a transmission 
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system was soon going to be in place to deliver their power to market. And, again, 
they suggested to the Canadians that they consider selling their entitlement for at least 
a thirty-year period, breaking the power into two blocks of twenty and ten years if 
necessary. 174 
The Canadians pointed out that the fixed price offered to them by the U.S. was 
politically unrealistic for them to accept because ofthe predictable rise in its value 
over a thirty-year period. In response, the U.S. team noted "the United States was not 
asking for this power, had not contemplated its being sold in the United States and was 
therefore not in a position ofhaggling for an unfair price for something it wants." If 
Canada wanted to sell their power in the United States, they would have to acquiesce 
to the reality of the competitive market conditions. Furthennore, the Americans 
insisted that the price of3.75 mills was arrived at because they found it to be the 
average cost of power marketable to California over the thirty-year period they were 
contemplating. "The power would be worth less than that in the first ten years and 
more than that in the third [ten years of a thirty-year period]. It was worked out on a 
long-tenn basis to allow pre-financing of the first two dams.,,175 
At best, the U.S. team believed July 1964 was the soonest an independent 
entity could be created and the bonds sold to support the purchase of the Canadian 
entitlement. To expedite the process ofworking out the remaining details, it was 
agreed by both nations that two working groups be appointed, with four 
representatives from each side participating in each group. The first group was tasked 
174 Ibid. 
17S Ibid. 
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with the problem of identifying the exact size of the Canadian entitlement; the 
. second group was assigned to tackle the legal and financial challenges of creating the 
U.S. entity that would buy the Canadian entitlement. 176 
The full teams from both countries didn't meet again until December 30, 1963, 
when they reconvened in Washington, D.C. While progress was continuing to be 
made by both working groups through the end of 1963, it was acknowledged that both 
sides had much to do in order lay the groundwork for full ratification ofthe treaty in 
1964. Therefore, the negotiators worked up a final draft for the protocol, which 
established the parameters for the formal exchange of notes between the two countries 
to clarify the terms of the 1961 treaty_ Importantly, the negotiators also drafted 
language for the first exchange of notes that committed each country to a "best effort" 
agreement to overcome the remaining obstacles standing in the way of the treaty's full 
ratification. Specifically, they agreed: 
a) 	 the Government of the United States will use its best efforts to arrange 
for disposition of the Canadian entitlement to downstream power 
benefits within the United States ofAmerica in accordance with the 
general conditions and limits set forth in the Attachment, and 
b) 	 the Government of Canada will use its best efforts to accomplish all 

those things which are considered necessary and preliminary to 

ratification of the Treaty as quickly as possible, including any 

arrangements for implementation and acceptance of the general 

conditions and limits set forth in the Attachment. 177 . 
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Two weeks later, on January 13, 1964, the B.C. government fmally agreed 
to the selling price of 3.75 mills per kilowatt-hour for the Canadian entitlement. 178 
Soon after, on January 22, the Protocol and exchange ofnotes agreeing to "best 
efforts" was signed by both nations. An "attachment relating to the terms of sale" 
accompanied the first exchange ofnotes and provided details related to the Canadian 
entitlement. The new schedule for the construction of Canadian storage projects 
called for the completion ofDuncan Lake Dam on April 1, 1968, Arrow Lakes Dam 
(later renamed Keenleyside Dam) on April 1 , 1969, and Mica Dam on April 1, 1973. 
The total price of the Canadian entitlement ~as set at $254,400,000, to be paid in full 
. by the U.S. government upon full ratification of the treaty. 179 
With the most difficult negotiations behind them, representatives from both 
nations continued their "best efforts" at bringing the treaty to fruition through the 
spring and summer of 1964. In Canada, the matter was introduced to the House of 
Commons on February 27, debated on March 3 and 9, and referred to the Standing 
Committee on External Affairs, where hearings were held from April 7 through May 
21. After the conclusion ofthe hearings, the committee recommended the approval of 
the treaty and associated protocol. The House of Commons and Senate then approved 
the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol on June 5 and 9 respectively. 180 
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Authority, dictated over phone by Denis Kennedy, B.C. Hydro, Data to Kinney-Jan. 9, 1964, Box 

25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. The price of3.75 mills was based off a 60 percent load factor, 

delivered at the point of generation, in U.S. currency. 

179 Columbia River Treaty Documents, Protocol, exchange of notes, and attachment relating to tenns of 

sale, 20 - 29. 

180 Hilliker and Barry, Canada's Department ofExternal Affairs, 270·271. 

87 
In the United States, efforts were focused on the creation of a non-profit 
entity that would be able to sell bonds to cover the pre-purchase of Canada's 
downstream benefits. On May 19, the BPA publicly announced the creation of the 
Columbia Storage Power Exchange (CSPE), established in order to buy the Canadian 
entitlement generated at six federal and five non-federal dams on the Columbia 
River. 18i Money was raised for the purchase of the Canadian entitlement through the 
sale ofbonds to members of the Northwest Power Pool, which included private 
utilities and public utility districts, totaling $314,000,000.182 The bonds, in turn, were 
allocated equally between public and private utilities, with each utility essentially 
buying a percentage of Canada's downstream benefits. 
In order to avoid having the CSPE considered as a utility, and regulated as 
such, it was necessary to dispose of the Canadian entitlement without the CSPE 
actually conducting the sales. 183 Therefore, participants in the CSPE were allocated a 
percentage of the entitlement equal to their bond ownership, and then subsequently 
made their share of the Canadian entitlement available to the BPA in exchange for 
lSI Charles Kinney, Acting BPA Administrator, to all BPA customers, May 19, 1964, Canadian Storage 
(Apr. 1964 - June 1964), Box 25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 
The six federal dams are: Bonneville, The Dalles, John Day, McNary, Chief Joseph, and Grand Coulee. 
The five non-federal dams (owned by public utility districts) in Washington are: Priest Rapids and 
Wanapum (Grant County), Rocky Reach and Rock Island (Chelan), and Wells (Douglas County). With 
many of the region's utilities standing to benefit from the availability of both the American and 
Canadian entitlements of power stemming from the treaty, there was a strong incentive to assist the 
federal government in the efforts to secure the ratification of the treaty. 
IS2 John V. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: The Economics ofan International River Basin 
Development (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1967), 166. 
183 Conference and Telephone Call Report of Harold Kropitzer, Assistant to the Power Manager, BPA, 
regarding Mar. 18, 1964 Meeting of the Lawyers' Group of the Columbia River Treaty held in Seattle, 
March 23,1964, Canadian Storage (Jan. -Mar. 1964), Box 25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. If the 
CSPE was deemed a utility by either the Federal Power Commission or the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, it would have been regulated by the Federal Power Act and the U.S. Holding Company 
Act. 
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"stipulated amounts of capacity and energy, less losses, at designated points of 
delivery on the Participant's system.,,184 Because there was far more energy than what 
the Northwest could absorb in the early years of the entitlement, the BPA was 
positioned to deliver power that exceeded any participant's needs to markets within its 
transmission capabilities. California utilities were, ofcourse, the natural customers for 
this power, having seen it on the horizon since 1961. 
To no one's surprise, California's public and private utilities were eager to buy 
as much of the Canadian power as could be delivered. This foreknowledge, 
combined with the steady progress being made toward the creation of the Pacific 
Intertie was no doubt an incentive for British Columbia to push for the sale of its 
downstream benefits in the United States and for the American government to help 
arrange the unprecedented pre-purchase of such a large block of power. If there would 
not have been a ready market to absorb the Canadian entitlement, the history of the 
treaty negotiations would likely have been very different. 
By summer, imminent ratification of the Columbia River Treaty provided a 
much-needed incentive to keep representatives from California's public and private 
utilities at the negotiating table working toward compromise in the ongoing efforts to 
create the Pacific Intertie. As it turned out, there was much more demand in 
California for Canadian power than what was reported to the BPA in response to their 
earlier queries. In fact, the demand far outstripped the supply, adding to conflicts 
already brewing over intertie planning in California. 
184 Kinney to all BPA customers, May 19, 1964, Canadian Storage (Apr. 1964 - June 1964,) Box 
25597, RG 503, NARA Seattle. 
68 
90 
CHAPTER 7: The Confluence 
At the start of 1964, federal planners in the United States found themselves in 
an advantaged, though still tenuous, bargaining position regarding the creation of the 
Pacific Intertie. Congressional direction to construct at least one intertie connecting 
the federal hydropower systems of the Columbia River, California's Central Valley, 
and the Colorado River meant that even if all "good faith" negotiations failed with the 
California Power Pool, the BP A would likely still be able to dispose of its surplus 
power and meaningfully coordinate its operations with the Bureau ofReclamation as 
needed. The appropriation of$8.5 million to begin the necessary tasks of acquiring 
land and equipment and carrying out various preliminary engineering studies 
demonstrated to the California Power Pool that the project had considerable 
Congressional support. 
Progress made toward the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty only 
strengthened the federal planners' negotiating position. As the likelihood of the 
Canadian entitlement being sold in the U.S. market increased, so too did the urgency 
to build the Pacific Intertie system. The Canadian entitlement needed buyers, and 
California and Arizona utilities wanted the power to help rationalize their own 
operations and displace investment costs into additional power plants. As the full 
ratification of the Columbia River Treaty became increasingly likely through 1964, the 
stakes of failing to create the Pacific Intertie became high enough to keep all interested 
parties from walking away from the negotiating table. If a compromise could not be 
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reached with California's private utilities, then the federal government would be left 
with little choice but to build the intertie themselves. 
The year began with federal planners from the Department of Interior busy 
establishing a new federal yardstick for the Pacific Intertie. The revised yardstick was 
to be used in the evaluation of a second round ofproposals, invited in response to the 
Congressional direction to hold "good faith negotiations with utilities and other 
entities interested in constructing any portion of the lines involved, that their proposals 
will not result in benefits to the national interest at least equal to those to be derived 
from Federal construction.,,18S BPA invited all previously involved parties to submit 
"declarations of interest" to participate in the construction of an intertie system now 
expanded from its original Northwest-California vision to integrate Arizona's sub­
regional grid as well. By January 14, eleven parties had declared interest in building 
portions of the system, including: 
1. Portland General Electric 
2. Pacific Power and Light 
3. Pacific Gas & Electric 
4. Southern California Edison 
5. San Diego Gas and Electric 
6. Arizona Public Services 
7. International Utilities 
8. Northwest Intertie 
9. Harvey Aluminum 
10. Salt River Project 
11. Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles l86 
The letters of interest foreshadowed another round ofproposals similar to those 
presented to the BP A a year earlier, with two new developments. First, the inclusion 
185 1964 Public Works Appropriation Bill, 88th Cong., 18t sess., 1963, H. Rep. 902, 54. 

186 Kenneth Holum to Stewart Udall, Jan. 14, 1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 -Apr. 1964), 18119, 

RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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ofArizona into the inter-regional transmission scheme meant that interties 
connecting Los Angeles, the Colorado River system (via Hoover Dam), and Phoenix 
would be necessary. L.A.'s Department of Water and Power, Southern California 
Edison, Arizona Public Services, and the Salt River Project intended to participate in 
the construction of any intertie facilities necessary to integrate the Southwestern 
systems, and they submitted letters of interest stating as much. Second, L.A. indicated 
that its previous support for the California Power Pool's proposal, which it declared 
publicly in the midst of the Department of Interior's 1963 efforts to win intertie 
appropriations from Congress, was not as absolute as they had previously indicated. 
In yet another turn around, L.A.' s Department of Water and Power stated "the City is 
not committed to any plan or proposal and would favor Federal construction itthis 
would result in the most economic transmission service for the City.,,187 The city's 
waffling likely grew from the persistence of Intemational Utilities' effort to construct 
a DC line stretching from the Columbia River to their doorstep.188 Competition over 
the transmission ofNorthwest power to the city's grid would certainly have been to 
L.A. 's advantage. 
For the federal planners in charge ofestablishing the revised federal yardstick, 
the city's change in plans meant that a DC intertie passing from the Columbia River to 
L.A. through Nevada was viable once again. With a proposal by International Utilities 
already in the works, and considered by the BPA to be a "strong contender" by the end 
of February, Luce and his team revised their yardstick plans accordingly before 
187 Ibid. 
188 BPA Minutes of Administrator's staff meetings, Volume 4: 1963 -1964, Feb. 26, 1964, BPA 
Library. 
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announcing them to the public on March 11. The new federal yardstick for the 
Pacific Intertie system called for two intertie legs to be built between the regions: 
The first would be a 785-mile direct-current line from The Dalles, 
Oregon, to Grapevine, California, 30 miles south ofBakersfield, via 
Nevada. This line would be designed for 750,000 volts. The second 
transmission line would be a 500,000-volt alternating current line with 
a tap in northern California and one near San Francisco. Its first leg 
from John Day Dam...to Tracy ...would be about 590 miles long. The 
second leg from Tracy to Grapevine would be about 290 miles long. 
Both lines would stem from the same general area ofThe Dalles and 
would terminate at Grapevine, about 50 miles north ofLos Angeles. 
Line running from Grapevine would tie the southern terminal facility to 
Hoover Dam and Phoenix, Arizona, thus integrating the BP A system 
with the Bureau ofReclamation's Colorado River projects.189 
The deadline for proposals was set for April 17 , and all interested parties were 
asked to "demonstrate that they can build these lines and move the power 
better than the Federal Government and at comparable costS.,,190 
Upon the reception of nine formal proposals, a three-man team (consisting of 
Luce; Emil Lindset, Associate Chief Engineer from the Bureau of Reclamation; and 
Morgan Dubrow, Assistant and Chief Engineering and Technical Advisor to Assistant 
Secretary Kenneth Holum) was assigned the task of evaluating them in comparison to 
the federal yardstick established in March. 191 With the exception of two proposals 
submitted by the Arizona Public Service Company and the Salt River Project, each 
wanting to build a 345-kv AC line between Hoover Dam and Phoenix, and one 
submitted by Los Angeles, to construct the 750-kv DC leg between the Oregon­
189 Department of Interior press release: "Interior Establishes Criteria for Proposed Pacific Northwest­
Pacific Southwest Power Interconnection," Mar. 11, 1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 - Apr. 1964), 
Box I8119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
190 Ibid 
)91 The nine proposals were submitted by: 1) California Power Pool; 2) Pacific Power & Light; 3) 
Portland General Electric; 4) Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; 5) Harvey Aluminum; 6) 
International Utilities; 7) Northwest Intertie; 8) Arizona Public Service; and 9) Salt River Project. 
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Nevada border to Sylmar, the proposals were already very familiar to the evaluation 
team.192 
The proposal by Los Angeles was the most surprising. After having played the 
California Power Pool off against International Utilities to provide them with 
competing offers for Northwest energy transfers, the city had apparently decided to 
participate more directly in the Pacific Intertie effort. With Los Angeles proposing to 
build its own line, the economic feasibility of the DC leg was assured. But, there was 
still no guarantee that the federal planners would approve L.A.' s proposal, particularly 
since it appeared that L.A. was collaborating with the Power Pool, especially Southern 
California Edison, to a degree that made some members of Congress uncomfortable. 
Charles Buckley (D-NY), chair of the House Committee of Public Works, for 
example, was particularly incensed over the conditional language of L.A.' s proposal, 
which stated: 
This proposal is made with the understanding that it will be considered 
in combination with, and is contingent upon acceptance by the United 
States, of the proposal to be made jointly by the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, the San Diego Gas & Electric Company, and the 
Southern California Edison Company. 193 
The combination of even one of the two SOO-kv AC lines proposed by the Power Pool 
and the 7S0-kv DC line proposed by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 
if deemed competitive with the federal yardstick, promised to trump the federal 
192 Teletype from George Toman to Russ Holt, regarding Apr. 22, 1964 BPA press release, Apr. 21, 

1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 Apr. 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

193 Charles Buckley to Stewart Udall, Apr. 21,1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 -Apr. 1964), Box 

18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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construction of any interties within California. F or public power advocates like 
Buckley, the deal seemed rotten. In a letter to Udall, he argued: 
In my 30 years in Congress I cannot recall another instance in which 
the forces ofmonopoly have been bold enough to advance a scheme 
more prejudicial to the interests ofpower consumers in the Pacific 
Southwest and the American taxpayers than that which has been 
presented to you by the California power companies. Certainly this is 
the first time that a great American city has permitted itself to be used 
in such a strange fashion ... I am indeed surprised at indications that the 
callous proposals of the California companies and the City of Los 
Angeles seemingly may have been encouraged by the Administrator for 
the Bonneville Power Administration, Mr. Charles F. Luce, and 
members ofhis staff. 194 
Buckley requested Udall to have Luce turn over any "minutes, memos, notes, 
schedules for meetings, correspondence, contracts, drafts, technical data or other 
documents" related to the aforementioned proposals. He even threatened to amend the 
Bonneville Power Act "to require specific authorization for all transmission lines to be 
built within or without the Bonneville service area" if the Department of Interior were 
to move forward with any plan that "would result in monopolization of surplus 
Bonneville Power sold in California by a combine dominated by a gigantic power 
company.,,195 
Regardless ofBuckley's protest, an "interim report" on the nine proposals 
submitted to Udall's office from Luce's team indicated a clear preference for the 
L.A./Power Pool combination to complete the desired connections between the 
194 Ibid 
195 Ibid In a tactful response, dated April 24, Udall pointed out that Congress had given federal 
planners specific orders to carry out "good faith negotiations" with all ofthe utilities interested in 
participating in the Pacific Intertie's construction. Though he did not acknowledge Buckley's request to 
see all ofLuce's Pacific Intertie records, he did make a commitment to include him in the same 
information loop as the appropriation committees. See Stewart Udall to Charles Buckley, Apr. 24, 
1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 - Apr. 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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Columbia River and Los Angeles. On April 23, Luce reported his team's belief that 
"the most promising combination of intertie lines appears to be the following: 
Columbia River to Los Angeles 
• 	 500 kv, ac line: Bonneville to build through Oregon connecting 
with PP&L at Oregon-California line. PP&L to build 50 miles 
south connecting with PG&E at Federal cost. From there 
South, PG&E and Edison to build into Los Angeles at Federal 
cost. 
• 	 . 750 kv, dc line: Bonneville to build through Oregon, 
connecting with City of Los Angeles at Oregon-Nevada 
boundary. Los Angeles to build from there into Sylmar Station 
at Los Angeles. 
Los Angeles to Hoover Dam 
• 	 City of Los Angeles and Edison to rebuild their present 230 and 
287 kv lines, providing up to an additional 700 mw capacity at 
Federal cost. 
Hoover Dam to Phoenix 
• 	 Bureau of Reclamation to build frrst 345 kv line. Arizona 
Public Service to build second 345 kv line. 196 
Although the Department of Interior's final determination regarding submitted 
proposals would not be made official until June, negotiations among California's 
public and private utilities, largely regarding the terms ofuse of the Power Pool's 
intertie, commenced immediately. At the same time, federal planners resumed their 
attempts to: 1) win better terms from the Power Pool for the Bureau's Central Valley 
Project and wheeling charges for customers buying electricity over the Power Pool's 
lines; 2) clarify terms for the wheeling of both peak and off-peak power over L.A.' s 
lines (Oregon-Nevada border to L.A. and L.A. to Hoover); and 3) obtain assurances 
196 Interim Report on Northwest-Southwest Intertie Proposals, Apr. 23, 1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 
1964 - Apr. 1964), 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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regarding the purchasing ofboth BP A surplus power and the pending Canadian 
entitlement.197 
By mid-June, Canada's House ofCommons and Senate had both voted for 
ratification of the Columbia River Treaty, and the Columbia Storage Power Exchange 
had already begun firming up commitments for the purchasing ofbonds by members 
of the Northwest Power Pool in order to pre-purchase the entire Canadian entitlement. 
The subseq:uent availability (now seemingly assured) of the Canadian entitlement 
meant that the federal yardstick established by federal planners in March was 
insufficient to accommodate the expected volume of inter-regional energy transfers. 
Not surprisingly, federal planners expanded the size of the Pacific Intertie by 
accepting the Power Pool's renewed proposal to build two parallel 500-kv AC lines. 198 
A second DC line, built by the federal government and stretching from the Columbia 
River to Hoover Dam, was also added to the plans; however, the economic feasibility 
of this line was reliant upon electrical loads not expected to exist in Arizona until 
1975. Arizona Senator Carl Hayden, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
was especially keen on seeing the second DC line built, so it was rolled into the 
appropriation request submitted to Congress in June.199 
Just as it was beginning to seem that the Pacific Intertie would indeed be built, 
California's entire Democratic Congressional delegation balked at the plans presented 
197 Ibid Also see: Kenneth Holum to Robert Gerdes, regarding clarification ofthe Power Pool's 
proposal, April 24, 1964; Conference report from Goldhammer to Luce, regarding May 5 meeting with 
SMUD and the latter'S ongoing negotiations with the Power Pool, May 6, 1964; Supplement to Pacific 
Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie Proposal ofCali fomi a Utility Companies, May 9, 1964; all in 
PNW-PSW Intertie (Jan. 1964 - Apr. 1964), 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
198 The Oregon-based AC line was similarly expanded to include two parallel 500-kv lines, with the 
BP A building the portion of second AC line in Oregon . 
. 199 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response", 80 - 81. 
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by the Department of the Interior. Their primary contention was that the intertie 
plan, as submitted to Congress by Secretary Udall, amounted to a.federal subsidy 
supporting the growth ofPG&E's monopoly at the expense offederal, state, and 
municipal water projects in California. With the DC leg oftheintertie passing through 
Nevada (without any tie-lines to Northern or Central California), advocates for the 
Central Valley Project and the California Water Project, in particular, felt abandoned 
by the plan. They were convinced that the intertie plans promised to bring undue 
profits to the California Power Pool, while leaving both projects' projected power 
needs unfulfilled. On June 23, California's Democratic delegation sent a telegram to 
President Johnson demanding public hearings on the plans recently submitted for 
appropriations by Udall. Claiming "this is a matter ofdeep concern to all ofus in 
California," the congressional delegation warned Johnson that "whatever decision is 
made will set the pattern of power distribution from federal projects for decades, 
possibly forever.,,2oo 
A day later, public hearings were announced by the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, to be held on July 1 and 2. Before the hearings were held, Udall sent a 
letter to the entire California delegation in an attempt to address their concerns. In that 
letter he tried to frame the Pacific Intertie in its wider geographical context, explaining 
the federal government was still responsible for about 40 percent of the overall 
investment into the transmission system, with six private utilities and the City of Los 
Angeles responsible for 50 percent and 10 percent respectively. He recognized that 
200 Telegram from California Congressional Delegation to President Lyndon B. Johnson, June 23, 1964, 
PNW-PSW Intertie (May 1964 June 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
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some Congressmen felt that "because the Report did not recommend a Federal line 
through California, the whole Report should be shelved," only to quickly discount the 
idea. According to Udall, "the trouble with such a contention is that it assumes an 
alternative not open to us under instructions we have from Congress." To inform (or, 
in some cases remind) them, Udall included the relevant excerpts of the instructions 
given to him by the Congressional"appropriations committees requiring "good faith" 
negotiations. He then claimed: 
The City of Los Angeles and the three privately-owned electric utilities 
ofCalifornia have offered a plan with more benefits than an all-Federal 
line could provide-more capacity, lower cost, and greater benefits to 
public agencies and other preference customers.20~ 
California's Democratic Congressional delegation's summary response was 
made through a joint statement submitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
July 1 (and read by Congressman John E. Moss), which concluded: 
We urge that the Committee direct the Secretary of the Interior that no 
construction of the intertie should commence, unless at least one EHV 
a-c line is to be built by the Federal Government from the Oregon 
border to the Central Valley Project, or as an alternative of desperation, 
unless the plan is amended to provide for increases in Federal service to 
Central Valley Project preference agencies to provide for their load 
growth.202 
Under Udall's direction, the Department of Interior's negotiating team 
responded quickly to the crisis, and by the end of July a series ofcompromises were 
reached that allowed for intertie appropriations and the regional preference bill to 
begin moving forward again. Most importantly, the modified plan called for the 
201 Stewart Udall to John Moss and California's Democratic Delegation, June 29, 1964, PNW-PSW 
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202 Departmental Evaluation Team [Charles Luce, Emil Lindseth, and Morgan Dubrow] to Steward 
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Bureau ofReclamation to build and operate a portion of the intertie that allowed 
the Central Valley Project to essentially circumvent PG&E's lines in energy 
exchanges with the Northwest. Specifically, the Bureau would construct: 
A 500 kv line from the California·Oregon boundary into Round 
Mountain station about 100 miles south of the State boundary; and 
from Round Mountain a 230 kv line to Cottonwood station, where it 
would connect, directly and indirectly, with five existing 230 kv lines 
now carrying Shasta and Trinity power southward to Tracy. Such a 
line would be an extension into northern California of the Bonneville 
500 kv line proposed for construction from John Day Dam to the 
California-Oregon boundary. The approximate cost to the Bureau of 
Reclamation of such lines, including substation additions, is 
$20,300,000.203 
The new agreement also obtained an additional 200,000 kw ofintertie 
transmission capacity over the Power Pool's lines for the Central Valley Project, 
giving the Bureau a total capacity of 400,000 kw through 1980, enough to meet their 
customers' projected load growth until new power sources could be developed. The 
extra capacity for the Central Valley Project was released by the California 
Department of Water Resources in exchange for the BP A's and Power Pool's help in 
procuring what amounted to 300,000 kw of firm power (sourced from the Canadian 
entitlement) to 1978 and then 150,000 kw of firm power from 1978 to 1983. As a 
result of their trade, the California Water Project gained the ability to design their 
water pumping system for "optimum on-peak operation.,,204 As part of the deal, a 
related arrangement was also struck between the California Department of Water 
203 Stewart Udall to Carl Hayden and George Mahon (Appropriation committee chairs in the Senate and 
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Resources and the California Power Pool to establish tenns for an energy banking 
arrangement. The revised Power Pool intertie proposal describes this arrangement 
best: 
At the time the State begins to purchase 300 megawatts [equivalent to 
300,000 kw] ofCanadian entitlement power ...the Companies will at 
the State's request, on adequate notice, bank such power for the State, 
for subsequent use by the State during the period beginning April 1, 
1978, through March 31, 1983, to enable the State to take back up to 
150 megawatts during such period, thereby maintaining a rate of 
delivery ofup to 300 megawatts ... The Companies shall reimburse the 
State monthly for power and energy so banked and the State will 
repurchase such power and energy at such reimbursed price, adjusted 
for changes in Companies' power costs durin the intervening period 
rcand service costs incurred by the Companies. os 
On July 29, the Department of Interior distributed a press release announcing 
"all parties-private, municipal, State and Federal-have reached agreement on a plan 
for construction and use of the biggest single electric transmission program ever 
conceived in the United States." A $45.5 million budget request was submitted to 
Congress to begin construction in 1964 of a transmission system capable ofmoving 
"more than four million kilowatts ofpower ... equivalent to the output of two Grand 
Coulee dams or equal to the daily power needs of six San Francisco's or five 
Washington D.C. 's." The Pacific Intertie system was estimated to cost $700 million, 
with a federal share of $300 million.206 With the conflicts over the Pacific Intertie 
205 Supplement to California Companies' Intertie Proposal, July 15, 1964, PNW-PSW Intertie (July 
1964 - Aug. 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 
206 Department of Interior, Office ofSecretary News Release, "Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest 
Intertie Program Okayed by Federal, State, and Private Parties," July 29, 1964, PNW-PSW Intertie 
(July 1964 - Aug. 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. The Department of Interior's 
appropriation request called for $42.2 million for the BPA and $3.3 million for the Bureau of 
Reclamation. 
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resolved, the appropriation request sailed through both houses of Congress on 
August 14. 
A workable compromise on the regional preference bill soon followed in 
regards to the divisive Westland amendment. Drafted by Luce and PG&E's Gerdes, 
the new language limited Congressional approval to any new federal lines not already 
included inthe current Pacific Intertie plans. On August 18, the House passed the 
regional preference bill by a vote of230 to 134. Two days later, the Senate passed S. 
1007 unanimously, and on August 31, President Johnson signed the Pacific Northwest 
Consumer Power Preference Act into law.2°7 On September 1, delayed as a result of 
the pre-conditional passage ofS. 1007, the President signed the Public Works 
Appropriation Bill of 1965, officially releasing funds to begin construction of the 
Pacific Intertie system. 
Once the public works and regional preference bills were passed by both 
houses, the Columbia Storage Power Exchange was able to obtain a very favorable 
interest rate of3.85 percent and subsequently sold $314 million worth ofbonds to 
purchase the Canadian Entitlement in one lump sum. According to Douglas 
Norwood's interpretation ofa speech given by Bernard Goldhammer to the Western 
Political Science Association in March 1965: 
Had the interest rate been higher than about 4.26 percent, the treaty 
arrangements would have had to be called off, and the intertie, 
presumably, would have also have fallen through. Congressional 
approval of the intertie was a key factor in securing the low rate of 
interest for, the Canadian treaty bonds.208 
207 Norwood, "Administrative Challenge and Response," 85 - 86. 
208 Ibid., 86. 
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Amid much fanfare, Prime Minister Lester Pearson and President Lyndon 
Johnson met in Blaine, Washington, on September 16 (at the Peace Arch International 
Park on the Washington-British Columbia border) to complete the ratification of the 
Columbia River Treaty in front ofa crowd of 10,000 people. A day later, the 
President attended an "intertie victory breakfast" in Portland, Oregon, attended by 
representatives of all the major public and private utilities of the Pacific West states.209 
In his short speech to the group, Johnson noted the remarkable accomplishment that 
had been made possible through the collaboration ofpublic and private interests, 
stating: "This system is also the proofof the power ofcooperation and unity. You 
have proved that ifwe turn away from division, if we just ignore dissention and 
distrust, there is no limit to our achievements.,,210 Indeed, after a half-century of 
divisive quarreling between advocates ofpublic and private power groups and their 
advocates, history would finally show that successful collaborations were possible, 
even on a grand scale such as the creation of the Pacific Intertie. 
209 Tollefson, BPA and the Struggle for Power at Cost, 336. 
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Conclusion 
The creation of the Pacific Intertie resulted from the culmination of years of 
planning, negotiation, and compromise. While some of the efforts, like those related 
to the Columbia River Treaty, had been going on since the mid-1940s and were 
carried out on an international level, the active pursuit of the intertie's creation by the 
BPA, following their budget crisis of 1958, proved to be the catalyst that set the stage 
for the Pacific Intertie's official birth in 1964. Through the measured planning, 
articulated vision, and shrewd but conciliatory negotiating approach of the Department 
of Interior's staff, particularly at the BPA, the opportunity for success was made 
possible when all of the disparate forces came to rely on each others' parallel 
successes during the summer of 1964. 
In order for the Columbia River Treaty to be fully ratified, the Canadians had 
to dispose oftheir downstream benefits in the United States. For the United States to 
buy those downstream benefits, an inter-regional intertie would have to be constructed 
to transmit the Canadian energy to market in California. The transmission of 
electricity from the Pacific Northwest to California, would, in tum, require legislative 
safeguards that limited the export ofpower from the region to sales of energy surplus 
to the region's needs. And, those needs would become a precondition for the funding 
of the Pacific Intertie, which was, in tum, a precondition for the success of the 
Canadian Treaty. That all of the forces came together in a way that produced positive 
results in all regards is largely a testament to the steadfast leadership ofBP A 
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Administrator Charles Luce and Secretary ofthe Interior Stewart Udall. But, it is 
also an indication of the potential benefits that were possible at local, state, regional, 
national, and even international levels. 
By 1970, with construction complete on all legs, the Pacific Intertie allowed 
for the movement of more than 4,000,000 kilowatts of power among the electrical 
systems of British Columbia and eleven Western states, including 243 rural electrical 
cooperatives, municipal systems, and other public agencies.211 It had essentially 
become the backbone of the largest electrical grid in the Western world. In addition to 
widening the marketing area available to power producers throughout the grid, the 
Pacific Intertie also integrated the operations ofthe nation's largest hydropower 
system (BPA), the largest privately owned electrical system (PG&E), and the largest 
municipal power system (L.A. Department of Water and Power) in the country. 
As it turned out, the second DC line, stretching from the Columbia River to 
Hoover Dam, was never built. At fIrst its construction was delayed until contracts 
could be obtained in the Southwest to make it economically feasible.212 But, once the 
Pacific Intertie was in place, and its capacity steadily expanded, the feasibility of a 
second DC leg remained tenuous. Furthermore, the development of Southern 
California Edison's Four Comers thermal-power project created a sizable influx of 
firm power into the Southwest, inevitably making the feasibility of the second dc leg 
impossible to obtain. The Pacific Intertie was still expanded, but its growth came in 
2) 1 Department of Interior, Office of Secretary News Release, "Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest 

Intertie Program Okayed by Federal, State, and Private Parties," July 29, 1964, PNW·PSW Intertie 

(July 1964 - Aug. 1964), Box 18119, RG 305, NARA Seattle. 

212 Minutes of Administrator's staff meetings, Volume 4: 1963 1964, July 31, 1964, BPA Library. 
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the form ofa third 500-kv line, added to the system in 1993, which extended from 
The Dalles Dam to the Tesla Substation, near San Francisco. 213 
Since the creation of the Pacific Intertie, the lives ofWesterners have become 
integrated through an electrical geography most often taken for granted, itself a 
reflection of the system's reliability. While power lines stretch overhead along our 
roads, across our mountains, between our homes, and even underground, the 
connections they make between our lives and the power systems and environments 
where the energy is produced go largely unnoticed. Regardless of the attention they 
draw, the connections are real nonetheless. 
As we face the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century, our 
attention to these electrical connections will no doubt become ever more important. 
On one hand, with the grid already in place, power planners in the American West 
have significant flexibility in developing strategies to reduce environmental pressures 
currently pushing many species to the brink of extinction, particularly in our rivers. 
Theoretically, for example, the implementation ofmeaningful energy conservation 
strategies anywhere in the grid could create new opportunities to aid salmon by 
modifying the way we have managed the river system during the past half century. 
Advances in "green" energy technology could similarly benefit countless species and 
natural environments across the American West through strategies focused on 
conserving energy and replacing destructive production practices with more 
environmentally benign energy sources. Conversely, the grid's existence could just as 
213 Northwest Power Planning Council, ;'Pacific Intertie: The California Connection on the Electron 
Superhighway," Council Document 2001-11, May 2001. Last viewed March 24, 2008, 
http://www.nwcouucil.org/LIBRARY/2001l2001-11.pdf. 
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well provide opportunities to increase the environmental problems stemming from 
our industrialized, energy-intensive lifestyles. If current trends persist, our per capita 
energy use will continue to increase, and whatever green energy technologies are 
integrated into the grid will necessarily become supplemental power sources. 
Regardless ofwhat the future holds, it is clear that there is much that we still 
need to learn about how our nation's electrical grids came to be and how they 
function. As equipment ages and power systems become outdated in their production 
strategies (fossil fuel burning and the extensive damming ofour river systems, for 
example), there is much to be gained by understanding the history ofprevious 
generations' challenges, successes, and failures. This knowledge will no doubt help us 
retool what works, abandon what doesn't, and imagine new frontiers in energy 
production and transmission as we strive to meet the needs ofour own time. 
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